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Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms
117 Michigan Law Review -- (forthcoming 2019)
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Trump v. Hawai’i validated a prohibition on entry to
the United States from several largely Muslim-majority countries, and at the same time
repudiated a longstanding precedent associated with the Japanese-American internment of
World War II. This Article closely analyzes the relationship of these twin holdings. It uses
their dichotomous valances as a lens onto the legal scope for discriminatory action by the
federal executive. Parsing the various ways in which the internment of the 1940s and the
2017 exclusion order can be reconciled, the Article identifies a generative tension between the
two holdings. Contrary to the Court’s apparent assumption, the internment cannot easily be
rejected if the 2017 travel ban is embraced: There is no analytically defensible and practicably
tractable boundary between the two. Recognizing this disjunction and explaining why the
Court’s effort to separate past from present practice cannot prevail, I argue, reveals what
might be called an “Article II discretion to discriminate.” By identifying and mapping this
species of executive discretion, the Article offers a novel critique of the Court’s recent
construction of executive power in light of historical precedent and consequentialist
justifications. It further illuminates the downstream distributive and regulatory consequences
of executive power in the context of ongoing judicial constriction of Article II discretion over
regulatory choices.

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Faith
Laken for terrific research assistance.
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Introduction
When can the federal government disadvantage a suspect class because of an animus
against it? When the Supreme Court in its June 2018 Trump v. Hawai’i decision validated the
so-called ‘travel ban’—prohibiting entry by nationals from largely Muslim-majority
countries 1 —it also repudiated a longstanding precedent related to the Japanese-American
internment of World War II, Korematsu v. United States.2 The brevity of the Court’s presentation
seeds a puzzle: Why did the Court’s five-Justice majority conclude that these twin holdings
were compatible? How, as a constitutional matter, can exclusion circa 2017 be embraced
(however gingerly) while internment circa 1942-45 is kept firmly at bay?
The terms of this reconciliation will likely be consequential both in practical terms and
as a matter of constitutional theory. An integration of the Travel Ban Case’s two holdings
matters practically since it will shape whether, or under what circumstances, the federal
executive has power to act adversely by relying on negative stereotypes or facial classifications
concerning a suspect class. This follows, it is important to flag, without regard to whether one
believes animus tainted the travel ban’s gestation. The reconciliation of the Travel Ban Case’s
two holdings is also theoretically salient because of the light it casts on the historical and
structural assumptions of Article II jurisprudence. Understanding the basic terms of structural
constitutionalism illuminates Article II’s potential as an engine of, rather than an abatement
of, invidious social stratification.
In this Article, I deploy the disjunctive twin holdings of the Travel Ban Case as a means
toward identifying and anatomizing an “open-textured” Article II discretion to discriminate.3
Its first task is a close doctrinal dissection of the potential ways to synthesize the case’s two
holdings into a coherent whole. There are, to be sure, superficial differences between the
scope, objects, and effects of the Japanese internment and the 2017 travel ban that might allow
some constitutional partitioning. But I conclude that none of the potential doctrinal
distinctions yields a tenable demarcation between the prohibited and the permitted. Even the
most robust—the citizenship line—proves far more permeable than at first blush seems.
Rather than peeling exclusion and internment apart, close analysis of these two holdings in a
wider doctrinal setting therefore reveals a plethora of parallelisms and a poverty of plausible
separations. If the Travel Ban Case’s two holdings are to be held in view simultaneously,
therefore, it will require what F. Scott Fitzgerald once called “a first-rate intelligence.”4
Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (upholding the executive order “because there is persuasive
evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from
any religious hostility”). I will call this “the Travel Ban Case” hereinafter to avoid confusion; I use the term
“travel ban” because it seems to avoid the more normatively charged and conclusory terms employed by both
sides of the public debate.
2 Id. at 2423 (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history,
and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.”). The decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), is discussed in more detail at infra text accompanying notes 50 to 55.
3 Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (borrowing this term from linguist Fredrich
Waisman to capture the possibility that even precise legal terms might generate large domains of uncertain
application).
4 Cf. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE CRACK-UP 69 (1945) (“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to
hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”).
1
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My second, more substantial and ambitious, aim is to explore the historical and analytic
foundations of the open-textured Article II discretion to discriminate authority. A
reconstruction of its rationales reveals both formalist and functionalist ground. But the
authority to discriminate cannot be grounded on either text or structures. The historical
record, replete with instances of discriminatory executive action, does not support the
proposition that coercive executive power will generate more public goods than harms when
allowed to act in a discriminatory fashion. Comparative institutional competence, moreover,
falls flat as justification for judicial deference once it is conceded that the executive will make
policy in the first instance, with courts’ role limited to a verification of its rationality and the
absence of animus. The embrace of judicial deference to executive discretion is achieved at
the cost of asymmetrical blindness to the harm inflicted on suspect minorities. Perhaps even
most importantly, this Article II discretion to discriminate cannot and should not be surveyed
in isolation. For it will predictably interact with other strands of Article II jurisprudence so as
to shape the policy outcomes and policy-making calculus of the federal government. Rather
than a cost-justified insulation of sound executive discretion, the Article II discretion to
discriminate hence will have the dynamic effect of distorting federal governance, somewhat
akin to a subsidy for an inefficient domestic industry, with outcomes that have no clear
correlation to aggregate social welfare. Counter-intuitively, therefore, judicial expansion of
Article II discretion likely works over time to undermine the efficient federal production of
valued public goods.
The titular locution here is an important constraint on my claim: It is Article II and
Article II alone that now comes packaged with open-textured discretion to discriminate on
the basis of suspect classification, and to do so relatively candidly. This diverges from standard
accounts of antidiscrimination norms along two margins. First, it is often the case that a
challenged executive action is predicated on an authorizing federal law, such that it superficially
makes more sense to talk of the action as a joint product of Congress and the executive.
Indeed, both internment and the travel ban rested on some arguable claim to statutory
authority.5 But in both cases, I show, the impetus and design of the challenged policy came
from the executive. 6 Congressional imprimaturs of approval, such as they were, were notional
in both cases. The Japanese-American internment, for example, began as an executive order.7
The Japanese-American internment unfolding under the aegis of 18 U.S.C § 97a, a federal statute that made it
“a misdemeanor knowingly to disregard restrictions made applicable by a military commander to persons in a
military area prescribed by him as such, all as authorized by an Executive Order of the President.” Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943); accord Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 228 (1944) (citing the
same statute); The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (citing the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), and
finding that it “grants the President broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States”).
6 In doctrinal terms, this means my analysis cuts across at least the first and the second categories from Justice
Jackson’s taxonomy in the Steel Seizure case. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is
at its maximum …. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,
…. there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.”). I focus on these two categories because there is only one case in which the Court
has recognized the third category as controlling. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084
(2015) (noting that the “recognition” power at stake in that case fell within the third Youngstown category). My
analysis does not place great weight on the existence of an independent Article II authority to act contrary to
congressional intent in part because the cases with which I am concerned largely are not characterized by
interbranch conflict of that kind.
7 Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
5
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Only more than a month later did the military receive Congress’s benediction in the form of
a statute criminalizing violations of past and prospective orders.8 As importantly, the judicial
rationales for the narrowing of antidiscrimination norms flow from a theorization of Article II,
and not an understanding of federal power in the aggregate. More strikingly, when it comes to
discriminatory action, Congress alone does not enjoy the same margin of policy discretion as
the executive branch.9
Article II glosses of executive action pursuant to federal statutes are, it bears noting,
standard fare in the Supreme Court far afield from the questions examined here. Consider, for
example, the Court’s statement in Heckler v. Chaney that an administrative agency’s decision not
to regulate “shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 10 On Justice Jackson’s
canonical formulation, the combination of Article I and Article II authorities creates the
“strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”11 It commonly
yields in practice “a presidential authority to complete legislative schemes” above and beyond
the strict terms of legislative text.12 Article II’s penumbra, in short, penetrates and pervades
much of what is formally denominated statutory law.
Despite this doctrinal homology, a discrepant Article II authority to discriminate is in
tension with the prevailing view that constitutional antidiscrimination provisions under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bind equally all official actors, whether federal or state. 13
In part, I suspect this is because scholarship on antidiscrimination has not engaged with
developments in the separation of powers domain. To make sense of the discrepant power
identified here, I will emphasize a rich history of discriminatory federal executive action subject
to a distinct and different legal regime from state action. The federal commitment to

Act of March 21, 1942, codified at 18 U.S.C. §97a.
See infra text accompanying notes 201 to 202 (discussing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
10 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3); accord Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (same for criminal prosecution power).
11 Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
12 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2287 (2006).
13 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2107, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995)
(treating “the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments as
indistinguishable); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court's approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).To date, scholars mainly focused on various forms of selective incorporation that
constrain the federal government more than the several states. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for
Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1534 (2005) (“Whereas total incorporation
contemplates that the Fourteenth Amendment makes all Bill of Rights guarantees applicable against the states,
not all Bill of Rights provisions necessarily apply under selective incorporation.”); see also Brian Soucek, The
Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 160 (2014) (discerning a “return of
noncongruent equal protection”). As Rosen observes, selective incorporation has not yielded dividends in
terms of increased state freedom of action, Rosen, supra at 160, and so the putatively narrower discretion on the
part of the federal government under this doctrinal rubric can be safely ignored here.
8
9
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antidiscrimination norms in both domestic 14 and immigration 15 policy contexts has been
surprisingly tenuous, and seemingly conditional. My argument merely renders that historical
genealogy of the Article II discretion to discriminate lucid and apparent as a prelude to
considering its contemporary recovery, and implicit rehabilitation, in the Roberts Court’s
Article II jurisprudence. The latter’s common-law constitutionalism, in other words, is a
vehicle for the preservation and rehabilitation of bygone bouts of federal discrimination. It is
a means for rehabilitating rather than repudiating past state depredations on constitutional
equality.
A snapshot from history is useful to catalyze thinking about that history, and the
disjunctive federal power to discriminate. Consider the tale of young Fred Oyama, an
American citizen born and raised in the 1930s in southern California, where his non-citizen
father Kajiro Oyama farmed and then endeavored to purchase for his son several acres of
farmland.16 Fred’s life intersected with the Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination doctrine twice.
First, in 1942, Fred and his family were forcibly evacuated from their homes “along with all
other persons of Japanese descent” as part of the Japanese-American internment. 17 The
following year, the Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for a citizen’s violation of a
curfew order18 issued by General John DeWitt that excluded all “persons of Japanese ancestry”
from California and other Western states.19 Fred didn’t violate the curfew; but the Court’s
ruling determined his obligation to obey it. Second, in 1944, while Fred and his family
remained interned far from their homes, the state of California filed a petition seeking to
terminate Fred’s property holdings on the theory that the 1913 Alien Land Law20 prohibited
aliens such as Kajiro from purchasing property on their citizen children’s behalf. Although the
Supreme Court had previously upheld California’s prohibition of alien land ownership,21 in
1948 a unanimous bench held that the state’s Alien Land Law “deprives Fred Oyama of the
equal protection of California’s laws.”22 Fred got to keep his land. And five years later, the
See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN U NTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 164 (2005) (defining “white affirmative action’ as a central
element of the New Deal); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (exploring the role of federal housing policy in driving
residential segregation).
15 Several excellent histories defined their focus in terms of the racial content of federal immigration policy, see,
e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 18
(2004); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW, at xiv-xvii (1995); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF
IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 150-75 (2002). For a treatment of the legal history, see Patrick Weil,
Races at the Gate: A Century of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy (1865-1965), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
625, 627-38 (2001). I draw on these histories as needed but make no effort to recapitulate them.
16 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1948).
17
Id. at 637.
18 Conduct of Enemy Aliens in Military Areas, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543, 2544 (Mar. 24, 1942).
19 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86-87 (1943) (upholding a conviction under a March 1942 statute
imposing criminal penalties on anyone who “enter[s], remain[s] in, leave[s], or commit[s] any act in any military
area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of
War or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War”).
20 Cal. Stats. Ch. 113, 1913 (May 19, 1913). Japanese farmers’ “conspicuous success” and “gains in land tenure
and crop production” catalyzed a sequence of restrictive property laws designed, in the words of the state’s
Attorney General, “to limit their presence by curtailing their privileges.” Robert Higgs, Landless by law: Japanese
immigrants in California agriculture to 1941, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 205, 215 1978) (citation omitted).
21 Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923).
22 Oyama, 332 U.S. at 640.
14
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California Supreme Court would rely on the Oyama judgment to invalidate the state’s 1913
Alien Land Law.23 Kajiro would therefore have no need for subterfuge or circumvention to
preserve his son’s patrimony.
Fred and Kajiro Oyamas’ history exemplifies the divergent roles that discriminatory
logics can play in state and federal decision-making.24 Indeed, as if to illustrate and underscore
the disjunction between federal and state actors, the Oyama Court relied on one of the Japanese
internment decisions—an opinion that had been issued by an almost identical Court25—in
embracing Fred’s Equal Protection challenge.26 What rendered a federal action lawful thus
sufficed to doom the state’s action. The disjunction is even more striking once it is recognized
that it was the very same socioeconomic forces of discontent with Japanese economic success
on the western seaboard that motivated both the 1913 California law and the 1942
internment.27
The sole scholarly article to address the federal immunity from antidiscrimination is a
piercing 2004 analysis by Richard Primus of the Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in
Bolling v. Sharpe.28 In an extensive survey of the Equal Protection jurisprudence in the half
century after 1954, Primus demonstrated that “with respect to the heartland of equal
protection--the defense of racial minority groups against governmental discrimination,”
Bolling’s application of equal protection norms to the federal government has yielded very few
progeny.29 His explanation is as compelling as it is ambiguous: “shared federal norms,” often
implemented in the form of “statutory and administrative rules against discrimination” meant
that the litigants had “little need” for constitutional rules, which did not materially diminish
the practical burdens to suit that discrimination plaintiffs commonly confront. 30 Primus’s
explanation, though, does not explain the disjunction between Oyama and Korematsu—
challenges to policies that emerged from the same toxic brew of racial nativism. More is
needed to explain when our national government has been an engine of social progress, and
when its actions have calcified social stratification.
In exploring this question, I am concerned principally with policies that embody (and
hence might be challenged on the basis of) what colloquially can be called discrimination against
suspect classes. The term “discrimination” has a range of possible meanings. It is used in
constitutional doctrine to refer variously to a negative stereotype, a noncognitive animus, or
the deployment of a suspect classification in the course of articulating a policy (such as

Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
Oyama himself thought the state property prohibition more onerous than federal internment. Rose Cuison
Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U.L. REV.
979, 981 (2010) (quoting correspondence with Fred Oyama). Without condescension, it seems worth asking
whether there is a touch of adaptive preferences at work there.
25 Justice Owen Roberts retired on July 31, 1945, and replaced by Justice Harold Burton.
26 Oyama, 332 U.S. at 636 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 81).
27 On the common origin of these two measures in a widely held form of “racial nativism,” see Keith Aoki, No
Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" As A Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 37–38
(1998). Earlier internment in World War I had similarly had a racial cast, albeit one that targeted Europeans.
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 210-12 (2002).
28 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (mandating the desegregation of the District of Columbia’s schools).
29 Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 978–79 (2004).
30 Id. at 1024-25.
23
24
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affirmative action).31 In specifying my topic, I will not distinguish precisely between these
different conceptions; those distinctions are not relevant here. I also use the term “suspect
classes” to refer broadly to minorities that tend to be objects of animus or negative stereotypes.
In the constitutional doctrine, both race 32 and religion 33 have been identified as suspect
classifications, even if religious classifications are typically litigated pursuant to the First
Amendment’s religion clauses rather than the Equal Protection guarantee.34
My argument also has ramifications beyond the law of discrimination. To most
observers, the Travel Ban Case was obviously a case about discrimination. It was plainly
animated by President Trump’s statements “singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment.”35
And in the absence of those statements, it is exceedingly unlikely that a legal challenge to the
policy (if one had even been mounted) would have taken the public form and presence that
the case in fact did. Yet, it is not a precondition of my analysis that a policy be challenged on
antidiscrimination grounds. Indeed, one of the threshold challenges to the Japanese-American
internment was framed on nondelegation grounds; Equal Protection concepts took a backseat
because of uncertainty as to whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated
an antidiscrimination component. 36 The core challenges to the 2017 travel ban, similarly,
initially sounded in statutory terms and on Establishment Clause grounds.37 Moreover, at the
back end of the litigation, a majority of the Supreme Court in 2018 rested its result partially
on the authority of a First Amendment speech precedent.38 The majority’s conclusion was also
framed in stunningly broad terms, as pertaining to “[a]ny rule of constitutional law.”39 Its logic
thereby swept beyond the Establishment Clause, and encompassed other forms of invidious
motivations. An analysis of discriminatory governance mechanisms, this intimates, cannot
stop with a consideration of the law of discrimination. The shadow mapped here falls far
afield.
The argument has three Parts. In the first Part, I introduce the Supreme Court’s
interventions in respect to the Japanese-American internment and the travel ban. Because the
latter has obviously received less scholarly attention, I provide a more detailed account of its
origins and etiology. Part II then turns to the question whether the internment of the 1940s
can be analytically distinguished from the exclusion of 2017. I conclude that it cannot, even
by generous construction of the Court’s purported distinctions. Rather, I suggest that even the
most robust dividing line (citizenship) ultimately fails to provide a satisfactory account of why
For a full catalog of discrimination’s varietals, see Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. --, at 10-21 (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter “Huq, Discriminatory Intent”], (analyzing the various roles of
intent in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment).
32 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (declaring race a suspect classification).
33 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (listing religion as an inherently suspect distinction).
34 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1588 n.403 (2015).
35 Id. at 2417.
36 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943) (identifying both nondelegation and discriminationbased challenges); Primus, supra note 29, at 985 (“[A]t the end of the 1940s, the federal government's obligation
to avoid racial discrimination was articulated at the level of statutes and public policy rather than as a matter of
constitutional equal protection.”); accord Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 881, 883 n.13 (1998).
37 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2403 (noting jurisdiction of two questions, “whether the President had authority
under the Act to issue the Proclamation, and whether the entry policy violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment”).
38 Id. at 2419 (discussing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)).
39 Id. at 2419-20 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
31
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the Japanese-American internment could not be recapitulated, mutatis mutandis, today. Part
III situates the Court’s theory of the Article II discretion to discriminate in historical and
theoretical context. That theory, I suggest, is an unstable and ultimately incoherent confection
of formalism and functionalist arguments, albeit one that demonstrates a certain solidarity with
a historical commitment on the part of the federal government to the maintenance of social
hierarchies. I conclude by looking forward to the likely future path of federal government
development given the dynamic incentives created by an Article II discretion to discriminate.
I.

Two Histories of Exclusion and Internment

The Japanese-American internment and the travel ban are kindred policies. Both
overtly restrain(ed) the diffusion of specific national, racial, or religious groups into and within
the national demos. The project of demographic purification, however, was (is) pursued
through the formal rubric of different non-discriminatory Article II authorities in the two
cases. Both hence raise the question of how discriminatory terms can be woven into formally
neutral, otherwise constitutionally justified, policies. This Part responds to that question by
focusing on both policies’ origins and legal trajectories as a platform for a consideration of
whether the judicial repudiation of one can be squared with the embrace of the other. The aim
of what follows, however, is to capture details salient to the constitutional questions, not to
supply a full social history of the two policies and their impacts.40
A.

Internment (1942-45)

On February 19, 1942—one day after the Pearl Harbor attack—President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt promulgated Executive Order 9066 authorizing military commanders to
“prescribe military areas” from which “any and all persons may be excluded.”41 Thirteen days
later, General DeWitt proclaimed the entire Pacific coast a military area, citing the risk of
“espionage” and “sabotage.”42 Only then did Congress step in and legislate criminal penalties
for those who were to “enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military zone” contrary
to the instructions of a military commander.43 On the basis of that legislation, General DeWitt
promulgated the critical Public Proclamation 3 establishing a daytime curfew for “all enemy
aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry within said Military Zones.”44 Subsequently, 108
“exclusion orders” were issued requiring the departure of Japanese nationals and JapaneseAmericans from the Pacific seaboard states.45 Among them was Civilian Exclusion Order No.
34,46 which served as the basis of a criminal prosecution lodged against Fred Korematsu.47 The
A compelling contemporaneous study of the Japanese-American internment is JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL.,
PREJUDICE, WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954).
41 Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
42 Pub. Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (Mar. 2, 1942). A second proclamation, two weeks later,
expanded the military zones. Public Proclamation No. 2, 7 Fed. Reg. 2405 (Mar. 16, 1942). Two days later,
President Roosevelt mandated the creation of the War Relocation Authority. Exec. Order 9102, 7 Fed. Reg.
2165 (Mar. 2, 1942). This was done despite the absence of “consistent evidence either to allay or confirm” fears
of active Japanese American disloyalty. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 27 (1983)
43 Act of March 21, 1942, codified at 18 U.S.C. §97a.
44 Pub. Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24, 1942).
45 Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 939 (2004).
46 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (1942).
47 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American
Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 498 & n. 30 (1945) (discussing regulatory context for prosecutions).
40
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detained were initially held in assembly centers on the west coast. It was only after June 1942,
and the decisive U.S. military victory at the Battle of Midway, that some 100,000 men, women,
and children were moved to ten internment camps in the continental interior for terms of
incarceration that would last up to three or more years.48 Seventy percent of the detained were
U.S. citizens.49
In three cases, the Supreme Court confronted and rejected constitutional and statutory
challenges to different elements of the internment policy. The three cases train on different
elements of the overall policy, and hinge on different legal reasoning. First, in its June 1942
decision in Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court rejected a nondelegation challenge and a Due
Process challenge to a criminal conviction based on a violation of the curfew.50 Second, in
December 1944, the Court in Korematsu v. United States upheld a conviction for the failure to
report to an assembly center pursuant to a military order.51 The petition in that case sought
reconsideration of the Hirabayashi judgment, and lodged a range of rights-based complaints,
including an equal protection argument.52 The Court held that “as in Hirabayashi’s case,” it
could not “reject as unfounded” the military judgments upon which the conviction rested.53
Finally, in Ex Parte Endo—decided the same day as Korematsu—the Court granted the habeas
corpus petition of a concededly “loyal and law-abiding” American citizen of Japanese ancestry
on the ground that the government lacked statutory authority to detain “citizens against whom
no charges of disloyalty or subversion have been made” beyond the period “necessary to
separate the loyal from the disloyal.” 54 No question of constitutional law, however, was
resolved in Endo, although the canon of constitutional avoidance did seem to perform some
labor constricting the ambit of detention authority.55
I defer until Part II a more detailed discussion of the analytic fabric of the internment
decisions. That discussion is more sensibly situated in the context of a comparison to the

Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1413 & n.46 (1999) (collecting
contemporaneous evidence to the effect that Midway was widely understood to be a military pivot point when
it occurred, obviating the risk of a west coast invasion).
49 Kang, supra note 45, at 1013.
50 320 U.S. 81, 91-105 (1942). For a subsequent opinion relying on Hirabayashi to affirm another similar
conviction, see Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
51 323 U.S. at 221.
52 Id. at 219 (“[P]etitioner challenges the assumptions upon which we rested out conclusions in the Hirabayashi
case.”). Korematsu’s brief first set forth a nondelegation argument. It only then enumerated twelve individual
rights violations, including Due Process, Bill of Attainder and Eighth Amendment ones. Brief for Appellant, in
Korematsu v. United States, 1944 WL 42849, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), at 46-50. Item seven asserted that the conviction
denied Korematsu “the equal protection of the laws which is implicit in the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment.” Id. at 48.
53 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99).
54 323 U.S. 283, 295 (1944).
55 Id. at 300 (reading detention authority on the assumption that “law makers intended to place no greater
restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used”). Both Justice
Murphy and Justice Roberts filed concurrences in which they expressly said they would not “avoid
constitutional issues” but reach the Equal Protection issue. Id. at 308 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 307
(Murphy, J., concurring) (same). But see Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1954
(2003) (“[W]hat record we have of the drafting history of the Endo opinion suggests that Justice Douglas was
aware of the avoidance cases, and their characteristic phrasings, but wanted to frame his own analysis
differently.”).
48
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Travel Ban Case. Nevertheless, it is worth dispelling preemptively a trio of potential
misconceptions about these cases.
First, Justice Black’s opinion in Korematsu has attracted the lion’s share of scholarly and
judicial opprobrium. Justices Sotomayor, Alito, Roberts, and Ginsburg all disavowed it in their
confirmation hearing.56 The Travel Ban Case also singles it out for distinctive obloquy and
rejection.57 But the key precedent in terms of doctrinal logic is in fact not Korematsu. It is
Hirabayashi. The latter rejected both the nondelegation and the equality challenge, whereas the
former explicitly relied upon and reaffirmed the latter.58 Whatever “flawed reasoning or moral
vacuity” infect Korematsu equally afflict Hirabayashi.59 Given the explicit entanglement of the
two decisions, I will assume for present purposes that the Travel Ban Case’s repudiation of
Korematsu is also a repudiation of the relevant elements of Hirabayashi’s logic upon which the
former relied.60
Second, the importance of discriminatory logics in the genesis of the internment and
then the Court’s handling thereof are distinct questions; each is subtle in a different way. When
President Roosevelt and General DeWitt acted, the constitutional status of federal racial
classifications was at best unsettled. It was not clear the federal government was covered by
equality norms related to race and national origin.61 The question for them was hence one of
political morality, rather than law. For there is no real question that the internments themselves
were openly justified and implicitly understood by executive branch officials on the basis of
rank anti-Japanese sentiment shared in particular by Roosevelt and DeWitt.62 Contemporaries,
indeed, understood the internment to be policy predicated on racial grounds, and condemned
it as such.63

Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 393 (2011).
The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
58 See supra text accompanying notes 50 to 53.
59 Greene, supra note 56, at 425.
60 I cannot exclude the possibility that in overruling Korematsu, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion meant
to leave Hirabayashi as good law insofar as the two cases share a common logical and argumentative core. This,
indeed, would be one way to reconcile that element of the Travel Ban Case with the latter’s actual holding and
effect. At least for now, I will assume that the maximally cynical view of the Court—as engaged in a mere
display of casuistic rhetoric—is unwarranted. But you never know.
61 Primus, supra note 29, at 985 (“[A]t the end of the 1940s, the federal government's obligation to avoid racial
discrimination was articulated at the level of statutes and public policy rather than as a matter of constitutional
equal protection.”); accord Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 883
n.13 (1998).
62 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF J APANESE
AMERICANS 108, 110-12, 238 (2001) (documenting Roosevelt’s motivations regarding internment and his racist
views about the Japanese generally); IRONS, supra note 42, at 57 (same); see also Rostow, supra note 47, at 497
(noting racially charged public campaign for internment). Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu documented the
“questionable racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment” that
permeated General DeWitt’s June 1943 Final Report on the Japanese Evacuation. Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 235-36 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
63 Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo
Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 176 (1945) (noting that the internment was “the first instance in which the
applicability of a deprivation or restraint imposed by the Federal Government [upon a citizen] depended solely
upon the citizen's race or ancestry”).
56
57

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976

10
The Court, by contrast, faced a different choice: Should it change extant doctrine in
response to Roosevelt’s and DeWitt’s actions? If the Court failed in the Japanese-American
internment cases, its primary sin was one of omission. It refused to change the law in a relevant
way. This doesn’t mean it didn’t also commit sins of commission. Rather strikingly to the
modern ear, the Hirabayashi Court did not merely accept the military judgment, but extensively
endorsed the reasons for viewing Japanese Americans with suspicion—such as the “solidarity”
with each other, the failure of their “assimilation as an integral part of the white population,”
the teaching of Japanese nationalist propaganda” to their children, and the “irritation” of
legalized discrimination, which “may well have tended to increase their isolation, and in many
instances their attachments to Japan and its institutions.” 64 Reliance on negative racial
stereotypes, in short, was not confined to the executive branch but contaminated the judiciary
too.65
Finally, it is important to stress that none of the three internment cases pass upon the
constitutionality of the internment itself. Hirabayashi concerned a curfew. Korematsu involved a
refusal to report to an assembly center. In the latter case, Justice Black’s majority opinion
contorted itself to avoid addressing the detention.66 An order to report to an assembly center,
Black reasoned somewhat facetiously, would not necessarily have resulted in “detention in a
relocation center” so the “lawfulness of one does not necessarily determine the lawfulness of
the others.”67 In closing, Black gestured to Endo for illumination of the constitutionality of the
internment.68 Yet Endo was a consciously, even aggressively, statutory decision that eschewed
constitutional questions—to the dismay of the concurring Justices.69
Korematsu is in some respects therefore a strikingly weak choice as the nemesis of good
constitutional judging. Its errors are parasitic, and ordinary of stare decisis.70 The decision
upon which it relies, Hirabayashi, overtly betrays the Court’s sympathy with and eliciting of
anti-Japanese stereotyping through a rather vile slander against Japanese-American children.
At the same time, neither Korematsu nor Hirabayashi nor even Endo speaks to the
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96-98 (1943).
Does such contamination require overt endorsement? Or is an enabling complicity enough? Because my
inquiry here is legal rather than moral in focus, I do not pursue those questions in relation to the Travel Ban
Case.
66 This is not a new observation. Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the Japanese-American Evacuation and Internment,
59 WASH. L. REV. 843, 855 (1984) (describing the Court as “strain[ing] to separate the inseparable”); accord
Kang, supra note 45, at 952. Irons notes that Black’s distinction was “highly misleading” since “only a very few
Japanese Americans” were not moved to the internment camps. IRONS, supra note 42, at 329.
67 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221 (1944).
68 Id. at 222.
69 See supra text accompany note 55. Patrick Gudridge argues that “Endo closed the camps.” Gudridge, supra
note 55, at 1934. He further suggests that Korematsu’s “sharp distinction between evacuation and detention …
kept difficult inquiries at bay [and] limited any resulting injustice to only the relatively few individuals
prosecuted for curfew or evacuation order violations.” Id. at 1946. But this is an exaggeration. Endo applied
only to citizens—who made up only some two-thirds of the interned—and then only to “loyal and lawabiding” ones. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 295 (1944). A vast and murky league of discretion lies in that
alliterative qualification.
70 And if that is enough to damn an opinion, then the apple must fall far from the tree: For Korematsu, in turn,
“receive[d] consistently positive citation … for its early articulation of the strict scrutiny standard.” Greene,
supra note 56, at 456. Even this is a mistake. “Before the 1960s, there was no strict scrutiny as we know it
today.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2007). Rather than one
origin, Fallon emphasizes the numerosity of strict scrutiny’s parentage.
64
65
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constitutionality of the detention of 100,000 men, women, and children who were, by all
accounts, uniformly innocent of any wrong-doing. Even in its titration of constitutional
adjudication, therefore the Supreme Court pusillanimously managed to short-change some of
the most marginalized and despised petitioners who clamored for their liberties before the
bench.
B.

Exclusion (2017-)

Litigation concerning the travel ban arose against a pattern of public statements by
officials, including the prevailing candidate for the presidency and subsequent occupant of the
Oval Office, all of which bespoke unequivocal hostility to Muslim citizens and noncitizens
alike. A full documentation of those statements occupies 26 pages of a brief filed before the
Supreme Court.71 I will not recite them all here, but note a choice few. The statements began
with a call from the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential race for “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” on the basis of the “great hatred
towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” 72 Exemplary campaign
statements include Trump’s comment to CNN’s Anderson Cooper that “I think Islam hates
us.”73 After inauguration, the President continued to associate Islam uniquely with terrorism
in a manner that suggested a categorical and necessary connection,74 while his close advisors
compared Islam to a “cancer”75 and conceded that the chief executive sought to pursue antiMuslim policies while using facially neutral terminology. 76 These statements occurred,
moreover, in the context of a transnational rise in “authoritarian populism”77 that mobilized
electorates by appealing (often very successfully) to their fear of Islam as a violent and alien

Brief for The Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 5–31, in Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, (2018), at 5-31.
72 Press Release, Donald J. Trump Presidential Campaign, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim
Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015) (originally published on donaldjtrump.com, later removed from the website, but
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20151207230751/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/pressreleases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration); see also Jose A. DelReal, Trump
Campaign Staff Redirects, Then Restores, Mention of Muslim Ban from Website, WA. PO. (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/10/trump-campaign-staff-deletesmention-of-muslim-ban-from-website (noting Trump's statements targeting the entry of Muslims to the United
States).
73 Interview by Anderson Cooper with Donald Trump, on Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Mar.
9, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/09/acd.01.html
[https://perma.cc/XZE8-XFBF]).
74 Dan Merica, Trump Signs Executive Order to Keep Out ‘Radical Islamic Terrorists', CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:02 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-plans-to-sign-executive-action-on-refugees-extremevetting/ [http://perma.cc/4BXH-NE3V] (explaining that the President spoke of keeping out “radical Islamic
terrorists” and prioritizing Christian refugees).
75 Mattathias Schwartz, Donald Trump's National Security Adviser Michael Flynn Says Islam Is “Like a Cancer”, THE
INTERCEPT (Nov. 21, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/11/21/donald-trumps-nationalsecurity-adviser-michael-flynn-says-islam-is-like-a-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/Z6TB-ZQK7].
76 Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says--and Ordered a Commission to Do It ‘Legally’, WA. PO.
(Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslimban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-itlegally/?utm_term=.6552b19442ee
[http://perma.cc/J27M-NGHQ].
77 The term was coined in a brilliant essay by the British-Caribbean cultural theorist Stuart Hall, The Great
Moving Right Show, MARXISM TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 14-15,
http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/79_01_hall.pdf.
71
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threat.78 This political dynamic is a necessary piece of the context in which the litigation over
the travel ban arose.
1.

The First Executive Order

On Friday, January 27, 2017, a week after his inauguration, President Trump
promulgated Executive Order 13769, prohibiting for 90 days the entry of all non-U.S. citizen
nationals of Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, Sudanese, Somali, Syrian, and Yemeni nationality.79 Among
other measures, this order also suspended the entry of refugees under the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program, and indefinitely suspended the entry of all Syrian refugees. 80 These
measures, the order explained, were permissible applications of the president’s discretionary
authority under § 212 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”). Section 212—
which was to be the legal foundation for all three versions of the travel ban—vests the
president with authority to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants
or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem appropriate”
upon making a finding that such entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States.”81
The order “caused mass confusion at airports and other points of entry” because of
its abrupt and unanticipated imposition—as applied, passengers on on-bound flights at the
time of order’s issuance were barred—coupled to an absence of any preparatory groundwork
through the interagency process. 82 The measure, purportedly designed to enable “proper
review and establishment of standards to prevent terrorist or criminal infiltration by foreign

For a descriptive survey of this political formation in an international context, see Aziz Z. Huq, What is the
Case against Muslims?, in “THE EMPIRE OF DISGUST”: PREJUDICE, STIGMA, AND DISCRIMINATION IN INDIA AND
THE U.S. (Martha Nussbaum, Aziz Huq, Vidhu Verma, and Zoya Hasan, eds. 2018).
79 Exec. Order 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg.
8977 (Jan 27, 2017) (hereinafter “Executive Order 1”).
80 Id. §5.
81 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Prior to 2017, this provision had been employed on 44 occasions. Kate Manuel, Executive
Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief 6-10 (January 23, 2017) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44743.pdf. All of
these previous usages of § 212, however, largely involved far more narrowly defined categories of noncitizens,
such as “officials of the North Korean government or Workers Party of North Korea,” or those who have
participated in “serious human rights violations.” Id. at 1-2. The exception to this provoked perhaps the leading
judicial treatment of § 212 prior to 2017. The Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton Administrations had since 1982
engaged in the practice of interdicting some persons fleeing Haiti when they were still outside U.S. territorial
waters, for return to Haiti. This was deemed permissible notwithstanding statutory and international law
restraints on removal to possible torture or ill-treatment. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
158-159 (1993); id. at 164 n.13 (noting president’s reliance on §212 authority). Sale, however, primarily
concerned the scope of extraterritorial protections against transfers to torture, and so did not speak directly to
the construction of Section 212. Cf. Manuel, supra, at 3-4 (discussing Sale, and suggesting that the latter’s
construction of “entry” might influence the operation of § 212).
82 Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 758 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); see also Office
of Inspector General, DHS Implementation of Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry
Into the United States, Jan 18, 2018, at 5, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018-01/OIG-1837-Jan18.pdf [hereinafter “OIG Report”] (finding that “DHS was largely caught by surprise by the signing of
the EO and its requirement for immediate implementation,” having seen drafts only on the Tuesday and the
Thursday before its promulgation). Again, there is a striking parallel with the Japanese-American internment.
IRONS, supra note 42, at 77 (“Japanese-Americans confronted evacuation and internment almost bereft of
direction.”).
78
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nationals,”83 was also ambiguous in scope. It was textually unclear as to its application to lawful
permanent residents; the White House and the Department of Homeland Security initially
offered conflicting answers to that coverage question.84 As a result, U.S. residents of longstanding unfortunate enough to find themselves on an inbound international flight the day of
the order’s promulgation were peremptorily detained at U.S. airports.85
Six days later, the District Court for the Western District of Washington issued a
temporary injunction against this executive order, a measure confirmed on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit filed by the states of Washington and Minnesota.86 The
preliminary relief was predicated on the Circuit Court’s conclusion that lawful permanent
residents and nonimmigrant visa holders possessed a procedural due process interest that
would compromised by the first order.87 Despite some initially heated rhetoric,88 the Justice
Department filed a motion to voluntarily withdraw the underlying appeal while a new
executive order was prepared.
2.

The Second Executive Order

On March 6, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Secretary of Homeland Security
John Kelly published a letter citing the September 11 attacks and purporting to ask the
president to conduct a “thorough and fresh review of the particular risks to our Nation’s
security from our immigration system.”89 That same day, the President issued a fresh executive
order (with the same title as the first) directing an interagency “worldwide review to identify
whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country” for
the purposes of passenger screening.90 In order to “temporarily reduce investigative burdens
on relevant agencies,” the new order imposed a new 90-day ban on travel by non-U.S. citizens
or residents from all of the countries covered by the first order with the exception of Iraq.91
The narrowing of the second order—to exclude legal residents and Iraqis—meant that only
180 million people were barred from entry based on their nationality.92

Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry To The United
States, Jan. 29, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-unitedstates.
84 Dan Merica, How Trump’s travel ban affects green card holders and dual citizens, CNN, Jan. 28, 2017,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban-green-card-dual-citizens/index.html.
85 The executive order was deemed within 48 hours not to apply to lawful permanent residents. Id. Most of
those detained in the initial order’s application received exceptions to enter. OIG Report, supra note 82, at 5.
86 Washington v. Trump, 847 F. 3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), reconsideration en banc denied, 853 F.3d
933 (9th Cir. 2017).
87 Id. at 1164-66.
88 For an account of the President’s verbal attacks on the judges involved in this first stage of the litigation, see
Fred Barbash, Appeals court judges rebuke Trump for ‘personal attacks’ on judiciary, ‘intimidation,’ WA. PO., Mar. 16,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/16/appeals-court-judges-rebuketrump-for-personal-attacks-on-judiciary-intimidation/?utm_term=.6d8b3afd0175.
89 Letter from Hon. Jefferson Sessions and General John Kelly to President Donald Trump, March 7, 2017,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0306_S1_DHS-DOJ-POTUS-letter.pdf.
90 Exec. Order 13780, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209, §2(c) (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter “Executive Order 2”].
91 Id.
92 Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 771 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
83
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The second ban was challenged again in a number of federal district courts.93 A first
judgment, issued by the District Court for the District of Hawai’i in a suit filed by the state of
Hawai’i and a number of citizen residents resulted in a new preliminary injunction, this time
on Establishment Clause grounds.94 The Court rehearsed “significant and unrebutted evidence
of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related
predecessor.”95 (This judgment was disparaged by Attorney General Sessions as coming from
“a judge sitting on an island in the Pacific.” 96 ). The Ninth Circuit, upon appeal of that
judgment, declined to reach the constitutional question but held that the second executive
order exceeded presidential authority under § 212 of the INA.97 The crucial element of this
judgment was the Circuit Court’s observation that the second order “makes no finding that
nationality alone renders entry [of all covered noncitizens] a heightened security risk.”98 The
government appealed both this ruling and a similarly unfavorable ruling to the Supreme Court.
The Court granted certiorari and narrowed the preliminary injunctions to exclude those with
a “bona fide” relationship with the United States; Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch wrote
separately to indicate their view that the government should prevail completely. 99 On the
expiry of the second order on September 24, 2017, the Court dismissed the certiorari provision
and vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment as moot.100
3.

The Third Executive Order

The third version of the travel ban was promulgated on September 24, 2017. 101
Denominated a “proclamation,” this new order in effect tracked the two earlier orders in
The Civil Rights Litigation Clearing House of the University of Michigan Law School maintains a database of
all of the challenges filed against different iterations of the ban. See Civil Rights Litigation Clearing House, Civil
Rights Challenges to Trump Refugee/Visa Order,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44. As of August 1, 2018, the Clearing
House lists 35 cases, albeit some that concern Freedom of Information Act requests related to the bans, rather
than direct challenges. I do not map out all of the challenges to the bans here. Rather, I focus on the iteration
of the legal challenge that ultimately came before the Supreme Court on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit, while
also noting the important parallel action in the Fourth Circuit.
94 Hawai'i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136 (D. Haw. 2017).
95 Id. at 1136. In the parallel litigation, one district court in Virginia concluded that the order “was not
motivated by rational national security concerns,” but by impermissible bias. Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d
724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2017). A second district court in Virginia held otherwise. Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d
719 (E.D. Va. 2017). In Maryland, a district court issued a preliminary injunction on statutory and
constitutional grounds. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 555-64 (D. Md.). The
Fourth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the preliminary injunction in a fragmented set of opinions that rested
on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.
2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2017), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
96 National Public Radio, Hawai’i tells Sessions: ‘Have Some Respect,’ April 12, 2017,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/21/525050208/hawaii-tells-jeff-sessions-have-somerespect.
97 Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d at 762.
98 Id. at 772 (“The Order does not tie these nationals in any way to terrorist organizations within the six
designated countries.”).
99 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) (per curiam); id. at 2089 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
101 Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into
the United States by Terrorists or Other Public–Safety Threats. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017) [hereinafter
“Executive Order 3”].
93
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several material ways, but diverged in several important particulars. First, the third order
described an interagency process of consultation in respect to the evaluation of security risks
posed by different countries’ nationals.102 This process was said to have been headed by the
Departments of Homeland Security and State, and to have focused on deficiencies in other
nations’ information sharing practices, or other “special circumstances” particular to that
country.103 Its quality and integrity have been subject to debate.104
Second, the new prohibitions extended further than previous iterations in the sense of
covering more countries, but also cast a narrower net in the sense of including only certain
classes of immigrant or nonimmigrant visa holders. 105 Some countries—Chad, Libya, and
Iran—faced restrictions on immigrant and only certain nonimmigrant visas; a narrow band of
Venezuelans aligned with the government were banned. And all Iranian, North Korean, and
Syrians were denied entry.106
Third, the third order’s restrictions were in form permanent, albeit subject to periodic
revision. A Department of State “media note” suggested that “the restrictions are not intended
to be permanent … and may be lifted as countries work with the U.S. government to ensure
the safety of Americans.” 107 Indeed, on April 10, 2018, the White House announced the
removal of Chad from the executive order’s reach.108 Finally, the order contained a “waiver”

Id. §§1(c)-1(g).
Id. §1(i) (describing Somalia as having adequate information sharing practices, but finding “special
circumstances”); id. §1(h) (finding that Iraq had inadequate information sharing practices, but noting Iraqi
cooperation in fighting terrorist groups as a justification for not extending the order to Iraq).
104 Cf. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 268 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the
Government chose not to make the review publicly available”). Justice Sotomayor’s dissent observes the
possibility of bias having entered into the review process, but is hindered from any more detailed showing
because of the absence of information secured via discovery about that process. The Travel Ban Case, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2442 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.). In other contexts, contemporaneous administrative process has proved
vacuous. Michael Wines, A Question’s Murky Path onto the 2020 Census, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2018, at A12
(describing how initial account of how the administration chose to include a citizenship question in the 2020
Census “crumbled as more evidence has been unearthed” in discovery). It bears notice that no analogous
process of discovery occurred in the travel ban litigation.
105 Executive Order 3, §2.
106 Id. An unusual, and otherwise unexplained feature of the order is its imposition of more restrictive
conditions on immigrant as opposed to nonimmigrant visas. See STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 260-77 (6th ed. 2015) (explaining that
“nonimmigrant visas” encompass business visitors, tourists, temporary workers, and students, whereas
“immigrant visas” is a catchall that captures the residuum, but is largely comprised of family reunification,
employment, and “diversity” entries). It is not at all clear why those applying for immigrant visas would inspire
greater concern than those applying for nonimmigrant visas. To the extent the concern is that a person may
enter the country to commit an act of violence, it would seem that a (less regulated) tourist or business visitor
visa would be preferable because it is easier to obtain. The order’s focus on immigrants implies a greater
concern for the more regulated population of those coming largely to settle in the United States.
107 U.S. Department of State, Presidential Proclamation Fully Implemented Today, Dec. 8, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276376.htm.
108 U.S. lifts travel ban on Chad citizens: White House, REUTERS, Apr. 11, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chad-security/u-s-lifts-travel-ban-on-chad-citizens-white-houseidUSKBN1HH3FW. It is worth noting that this occurred while the challenge to the order was sub judice
before the Court, and would predictably have not have gone unobserved. Cf. The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2411 (2018) (noting Chad’s removal).
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provision that creates narrow discretion to issue waivers if an applicant makes a series of
demanding showings to a consular officer or border official.109
States, individuals, and associations that had challenged the earlier travel bans renewed
their legal objections on similar grounds. Again, the Hawai’i district court entered a preliminary
injunction against its operation, and again, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
injunction on statutory grounds.110 Key to this judgment was the Circuit panel’s conclusion
that “the Proclamation conflicts with the statutory framework of the INA by indefinitely
nullifying Congress's considered judgments on matters of immigration,” in particular by
deploying § 212 as a broad-brush substitute for statutory provisions addressing security threats
on an individualized basis and addressing security concerns through the visa waiver
program. 111 The Fourth Circuit reached the same substantive result on constitutional
grounds.112 Pivotal to its conclusion was the finding that “the face of the Proclamation, read
in the context of President Trump’s official statements, fails to demonstrate a primarily secular
purpose [but]…continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective.”113
4.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, found the order to be within the scope of
the president’s § 212 authority and not in violation of the Establishment Clause. As with the
Japanese internment cases, I defer critique of the case’s constitutional reasoning until Part II,
where it can be considered in tandem with the Japanese internment cases. Here, I set out its
basic logic, including its justiciability and its statutory elements.
Before reaching any substantive question of law, the majority had to address threshold
questions of constitutional and statutory justicability, including both standing and the notion
that an atextual emanation of the separation of powers (or some free-floating principle of
immigration law) precluded review. Both points were addressed in oddly conclusory fashion.
Hence, the Court addressed only the existence of Article III standing for the constitutional,
and not the statutory question,114 even though it had in an earlier opinion flagged the former.115
It then noticed the “difficult question”116 of whether constitutional and statutory challenges to
Executive order 3, §3(c) (allowing waiver upon a showing that “denying entry would cause the foreign
national undue hardship”; “entry would not pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United
States”; and “ entry would be in the national interest”). Waivers appear to be extremely rare. Yeganeh Torbani,
U.S. issued waivers to Trump’s travel ban at rate of 2 percent, data shows, REUTERS, Jul. 26, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ban/us-issued-waivers-to-trumps-travel-ban-at-rate-of-2percent-data-shows-idUSKBN1JN07T. In a telling circularity, the State Department’s own account of the
waiver process suggests that consular officers look at the very databases that the travel ban’s justifications
assume to be unreliable. Letter of Mary K. Waters, Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, to Hon. Chris van
Hollern, Feb. 22, 2018, at 2 http://paaia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Van-Hollen-Response-Letter.pdf.
110 Hawai’i v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam).
111 878 F. 3d at 685-86.
112 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018).
113 Id. at 268.
114 The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415–16 (2018). It had mentioned, without resolving, the standing
question in general terms in its 2017 per curiam.
115 Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017) (per curiam) (referring, without
resolving, the standing question).
116 138 S. Ct. at 2407.
109

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976

17
entry policy were justiciable—a point that occupied a full thirteen pages of the Government’s
brief 117 —and said merely it would “assume without deciding” justiciability. Given the
constitutional character of the Government’s justiciability argument, this is a somewhat illfitting formulation.118
On the statutory question, the Court rejected the submission that the finding upon
which the order rested was insufficient—reciting at length the interagency drafting process
described in the order’s text—and declined to find “any textual limit on the President’s
authority” under that provision. 119 Rather than cleaning separating statutory from
constitutional analysis, Chief Justice Roberts again blurred the boundary between Article I and
Article II120 by invoking “the deference traditionally accorded the executive in this sphere.”121
His analysis centrally rested on the vaguely stated impression that § 212 “exudes deference to
the President in every clause.”122 Other clauses of the INA were read narrowly, and practical
tensions or puzzling, illogical consequences of the Government’s position were ignored.
Consider in this regard the challengers’ observation that the travel ban applied to only
non-U.S. citizens who had already obtained a visa pursuant to a statutory framework that
imposed on them the “burden” of demonstrating their eligibility.123 Consular officers must
deny a visa even if it only “appears” a person is ineligible.124 Notice how this interacts with a
subsequent categorical ban: It is only those who meet the burden of demonstrating that their
documents and status are in order given the known reliability of their nation’s government, and who
can overcome the ‘mere appearance’ of ineligibility threshold, who are barred entry. In effect,
that is, the third executive order applied only to individuals who had already met the burden
of demonstrating their eligibility for entry given their country’s imperfect documentation
practices, and had proved the absence of any inadmissibility ground.
This would seem to be the kind of practical absurdity that, in other cases, the Roberts
Court has resisted when reading statutes.125 The Court’s response here, though, was a non-

Brief of Solicitor General in Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2018 WL 1050350 (2018), at 17-30
[hereinafter “Gov’t Brief”].
118 138 S. Ct. at 2407. A possible explanation is the existence of division within the five Justice majority as to a
justiciable controversy. At least implicitly, the Court must be read as rejecting the Solicitor General’s invitation
to hold that “a fundamental separation-of-powers principle” foreclosed any review of a decision “to exclude
aliens abroad generally.” Gov’t Brief, supra note 114, at 17.
119 138 S. Ct. at 2409-11.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 11.
121 138 S. Ct. at 2409 (describing the “sphere” somewhat loosely in terms of “the context of international affairs
and national security” (citation omitted).
122 Id. at 2411.
123 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (“[T]he burden of proof shall be upon such person to establish that he is eligible to receive
such visa or such document, or is not inadmissible under any provision of this chapter ….”); see also Brief of
Respondents in Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2018 WL 1468304 (2018), at 48-49.
124 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (“No visa or other documentation shall be issued to an alien if… it appears to the
consular officer, from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such alien is
ineligible ….”).
125 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015) (rejecting a reading of the Affordable Care Act that
“would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the
very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid”); Abbe Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts:
Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66 (2015) (“One way to
117
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sequitor: “Unless consular officials are expected to apply categorical rules [such as the third
executive order] … fraudulent or unreliable documentation may thwart their review ….”126
Generously construed, this assumes that consular officers ignore the statutory burden of proof
by relying on documents that are possibly “fraudulent or unreliable” under their own
Department’s rules. That is, the Court’s logic here inverts the ordinary presumption of
regularity. 127 It repudiates an absurd result of its statutory construction by assuming the
existence of negligence or deliberate violation of the law by executive branch officials.128
Turning to the challengers’ claim under the Establishment Clause, the Court began by
rejecting the government’s argument that evidence beyond the text of the order itself was
irrelevant.129 That evidence, however, played only a limited role in the Court’s decision. This
was a consequence of two key analytic moves.
First, the Court distinguished between “the statements of a particular President,” and
“the authority of the Presidency itself.”130 By this rhetorical flourish, the majority shifted the
focus of inquiry from the specific individuals occupying the White House to the generic
institution of “Presidency.” This distinction recalls to a dichotomy proffered by the nineteenth
century English constitutional theorist Walter Bagehot between the “dignified” parts of the
constitution, which “excite and preserve the reverence of the population,” and “the efficient”
element, “which … in fact, works and rules.”131 Ignore the working presidency, the Court in
effect said, and pay attention to its reverence-inducing dignity.
In considering the institutional rather than the idiosyncratic presidency, the Court
directed attention away from questions of discrimination. By framing “the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals” as a “fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control,” it invoked
structural constitutional concerns arising from decisions that “implicate relations with foreign
powers, or involve classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances.”132 Here, what is initially a claim about both political departments ultimately
turns on subject-matter expertise and institutional competencies particular to the executive.133
In this fashion, a claim about joint power shifts gears to become a brief for Article II
understand King is that the Chief Justice chooses the holistic side of textualism, one that has always shared with
purposivism the assumption that Congress legislates rationally, with means to an end.”).
126 138 S. Ct. at 2411.
127 United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) (presumption of regularity supports official
act of public officer).
128 138 S. Ct. at 2411.
129 Compare id. at 2420 (holding that “we may consider plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence”), with Gov’t Brief, supra
note 114, at 66 (“Impugning the official objective of a formal national-security and foreign-policy judgment of
the President based on campaign-trail statements is inappropriate and fraught with intractable difficulties.”).
130 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
131 WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 7 (Miles Taylor, ed., 2001).
132 138 S. Ct. at 2418-19 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2420
(suggesting that the case arose in the “national security and foreign affairs context”).
133 In the immigration domain, many “early cases elide the difficult question of how the Constitution allocates
immigration authority between the President and Congress.” Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 472 (2009). In this respect, as in many others, the Travel Ban
Case is a return to older jurisprudential practices. See infra text accompanying notes 188 to 191 (noting parallels
to Progressive Era race jurisprudence).
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authority.134 Consistent with this framing, there is scant evidence suggesting the president was
pursuing any policy agenda of either a contemporary or past Congress. 135 Moreover, the
breadth of the “foreign affairs” and “national security” justifications, and their discontinuity
from the Court’s tighter framing of the issue as concerning “the admission and exclusion of
foreign nationals,”136 suggests that the case should be understood as concerning Article II
generally—not merely a pocket of immigration law.137
The second element of the majority’s arguments built on the assumption that it was
the institutional, dignified executive that properly occupied the analytic lens, rather than the
haphazard particulars of a given moment. With that assumption in hand, the Court framed its
central constitutional inquiry as a “deferential” species of rational basis review138 familiar from
earlier generations of immigration jurisprudence.139 The form of that review, however, is worth
specifying in some detail because it diverges from the modality of rational basis review in other
precincts of constitutional law.
To begin, the Court framed that the overall inquiry was aimed at determining whether
a challenged policy “is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the
country and improve vetting processes.” 140 Applying this ‘plausibility’ standard, the Court
suggested that if the existence of “persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a
legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we
must accept that independent justification.”141 This was not the only formulation offered by
the majority. Elsewhere, it suggested that unless the executive order was “inexplicable by
See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 11 (noting this blurring in the larger context of structural
constitutional analysis). For an earlier treatment of immigration as an executive matter, see Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (stating that the powers to exclude and expel “may be exercised entirely
through executive officers”).
135 This does not distinguish the uses of § 212 at issue here. Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 116 (2015) [hereinafter “Cox and Rodríguez, President and
Immigration Law Redux”] (“Throughout the twentieth century, and up to the present, the President has used
powers expressly delegated to him by Congress to advance his own immigration agenda.”).
136 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
137 I build on this point in Part II, infra.
138 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
139 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the United
States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application.”); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893) (“[In determining] whether
the acts of the legislature or of the executive are consistent with the Constitution, it behooves the court to be
careful that it does not undertake to pass upon political questions, the final decision of which has been
committed by the Constitution to the other departments of the government.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (executive “determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are
necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers” [and]…“conclusive upon the judiciary”).
140 138 S. Ct. at 2420. Note how this echoes the “requirement of plausibility” that has been demanded when
civil plaintiffs seek to overcome a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 (2010) (“Under the plausibility-pleading standard,
the Court has vested trial judges with the authority to evaluate the strength of the factual “showing” of each
claim for relief and thus determine whether it should proceed.”).
141 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2421. Moreover, there is some evidence in the opinion that it does not apply
solely to First Amendment Religion Clause claims. Id. at 2418 (noting that earlier precedent “reaffirmed and
applied [a] deferential standard of review across different contexts and constitutional claims” (emphasis added)).
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anything [other than] animus,”142 it would have to be sustained. Depending on the meaning of
“inexplicable,” this standard might be glossed as more favorable to the government than a test
that hinged on the production of “plausibl[e]” evidence. The Court also suggested, however,
that what counts as “plausibl[e]” evidence encompassed a wide domain. Having rehearsed
once the virtues of the “worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet agencies,”
the majority also rejected the possibility of “substitut[ing] our own assessment for the
Executive’s predictive judgments.”143
The standard of review applied by the Travel Ban Case majority, therefore, is distinct
from one pursuant to which the state “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification.”144 Applying the latter standard in the canonical cases
first limning the operation of rational basis review, the Justices have been willing to
hypothesize ex post reasons that “might have” justified a challenged state action.145 It was
quickly noted that the breadth of the judicial imagination meant that few challenged state
actions would fall before this (inaptly named) ‘scrutiny.’146
But this is not the form of rational-basis standard applied in the Travel Ban Case. The
Court’s application of that framework is focused on “evidence,” a term that implies a
consideration of the actual reasons (rather than the universe of potential hypothesized reasons)
for a challenged state action.147 Indeed, the Court did look at the reasons supplied by the third
executive order; it did not hypothesize its own. At the same time, the precise form of meansend rationality demanded by the Court was exceptionally weak. At best, its demand for
‘plausible’ reasons appears to track earlier rational basis jurisprudence that disallowed serious
scrutiny of proffered justifications. 148 At the limit, the superficiality of such judicial
consideration predetermines the outcome of review: Any minimally competent executive
branch lawyer, after all, can almost always gin up ex ante a ‘plausible’ reason for a
Id.
Id. at 2421-22.
144 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
145 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (hypothesizing rationales that a state legislature
“might have” or “may have” had in enacting a statute to validate provisions distinguishing between
ophthalmologists and optometrists on the one hand and opticians on the other); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (hypothesizing rationales that a state legislature might have had and stating
that “[i]t would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say” such a rationale was not the reason local
authorities enacted the regulation).
146 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-- Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (criticizing the Court for saving legislation by
“exercising its imagination”). For a more recent recapitulation of this concern, see Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (“Because judges could imagine many things, ordinary
rational basis review was tantamount to a free pass for legislation.”).
147 The Roberts Court has looked at hypothesized reasons for a state action, for example, in the postconviction
habeas context, see, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
148 See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (holding that rational basis review does not “authorize ‘the judiciary [to] sit as
a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations”’) (citation omitted));
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam) (asking whether a measure is “rationally
related” to the putative state goal, a seemingly wholly etiolated standard). The Travel Ban Court unpersuasively
suggested that its analysis tracked instances in which the Court has invalidated a measure because it is founded
on “a bare...desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985); cf. Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct.
at 2421. But in cases such as Moreno and Cleburne, the problem was not that the state defendant lacked plausible
reasons for the challenged action; the problem was that they were not plausible enough.
142
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discriminatory policy.149 If the executive declines to do so, it is likely because the political gains
from engaging in untrammelled discrimination outweigh its legal risks.
Applying this standard, the Court offered a trio of arguments. Even on their face, these
are hardly overwhelming. First, it underscored the absence of animus on the face of the order.
This blinked, however, the presence of coded discriminatory terms in both of the earlier
orders.150 To the extent that the third order is naturally understood as a continuation and
reiteration of those earlier,151 this textual evidence seems unreasonably overlooked.
Second, the Court underscored the review process described in § 1 of the order. But
it did so while declining to scrutinize whether it was a process that in fact deliberated to
determine an outcome that was not ex ante foreordained. To anticipate a point that will play
a greater role in Part III, the majority’s willingness to endorse, mechanically and without
meaningful scrutiny, an administrative process as legitimate and legitimating is in striking
contrast to the same Justices’ reluctance to credit the efforts of administrative agencies to settle
on authoritative constructions of ambiguous federal statutes in the regulatory context.152 The
question of why procedural exertions by some regulatory agencies catalyzes judicial deference,
and others provoke only skepticism from the federal bench, should be kept in mind for now.
Third, the Court pointed to the several ways in which the order was underinclusive as
a prohibition based on religion, insofar as it excluded many Muslim countries; had been
reworked to Iraq and Chad; and contained safety valves in the form of exceptions and
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 490 (2004) (“[T]he [rational basis]
standard's emphasis on deference at times leads courts to skip over the required step of evaluating the link
between that permissible goal and the government's action.”). Counting against this reading is Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence which underscores the Court does acknowledge that in some instances, governmental
action may be subject to judicial review to determine whether or not it is “inexplicable by anything but
animus.” 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 Both the first and the second executive orders discuss “honor killings”—the homicide of a family member,
typically female, due to the perpetrator’s belief that the victim has shamed the family, usually by violating a religious tenet. LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? 113-14 (2013). The first an intent to
prohibit “those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred . . . including ‘honor’ killings.” Executive Order 1 §1
Both orders compel the Director of Homeland Security to collect information regarding “honor killings”
perpetrated by foreign nationals. Id. §10(iii); Executive Order 2 §11. The practice of “honor killings” has never
been tied to international terrorism. There is no known association between “honor killings” and the six
countries at issue in this case—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria or Yemen. Cf. K.M. Devries et al., The Global
Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women, 340 SCIENCE 1527, 1528 (2013) (finding that the incidence of
intrafamialial violence exceeds 19 percent everywhere in the world except east Asia). Nor is there any
connection between the incidence of “honor killings” and the likelihood that a government of one of those
nations will supply information requested by U.S. immigration authorities. But the term “honor killing” has
long been used to denigrate Islam as a violent and dangerous faith. KATHERINE PRATT EWING, STOLEN
HONOR: STIGMATIZING MUSLIM MEN IN BERLIN 151–53 (2008); Leti Volpp, Framing Cultural Difference:
Immigrant Women and Discourses of Tradition, 22 DIFFERENCES: J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 90, 90–91
(2011). Hence, the term “honor killing” is a way of misleadingly categorizing violence against women as a
Muslim problem, and so “consolidating the stigmatization” of Muslim communities as deficient, backward, and
prone to violence. ABU-LUGHOD, supra, at 113.
151 As the Court did at other points, See, e.g., The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (noting the
dropping of Iraq from the second order).
152 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3058276, at *14 (June 21, 2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615-16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (Justice
Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts's opinion.
149
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waivers.153 The argument from underinclusion is perhaps the weakest of the three reasons. No
case law of which I am aware suggests that a finding of discrimination can be made only if it
is shown that a defendant discriminated against all persons of the relevant class who came into
his or her purview. Sexual harassment claims, for example, do not require a showing that any
(let alone all) other women (or men) were objects of harassment. A race-based discrimination
claim lodged against a police officer or prosecutor need not include evidence that the official
discriminated against every member of the relevant race that came across their radar. And no
one thinks that Jim Crow generally would have been any less offensive had a token AfricanAmerican been allowed to shop at Woolworths.154 Underinclusiveness, in short, is not usually
thought to be evidence that discrimination is not at work.155 The Court supplies no reason why
this general principle should not be true in the Travel Ban Case.
The final element of the majority’s decision is the most provocative, and most
analytically fruitful, from my perspective: Responding to Justice Sotomayor’s powerful dissent,
which focused on the ample evidence of discriminatory intent and the absence of credible
evidence of a national security justification, Chief Justice Roberts took umbrage at her
invocation of the Korematsu decision.156 I reproduce in full his response:
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S.
citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is
objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is
wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy
denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry
suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been
taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of
this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. The
dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity
to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day
it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—
“has no place in law under the Constitution.157
It is how this passage fits with the balance of the majority opinion that is the focus of the next
Part—and the analytic pivot for a more careful consideration of the nature of Article II
discretion in relation to discriminatory actions.158
Id. at 2420-23.
On the insufficiency of “tokenism” more generally, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action,
and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1214 & n.83 (2002). Of course, such tokenism would make
circumvention of antidiscrimination norms trivial.
155 Note that this is true even in cases such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which are cited by the
majority. See Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. The state of Colorado eliminated certain antidiscrimination
protections from gays and lesbians; it did not (thankfully) require them to wear pink
triangles, or to report for sterilization. Hence, Colorado’s action was ‘underinclusive’ in the sense that it did not
take animus to its logical extreme (and may not have directly burdened every LGBTQ person in the state).
156 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today's holding is all the more troubling
given the stark parallels between the reasoning of this case and that of Korematsu ….”).
157 Id. at 2420 (citations and internal cross references omitted).
158 Because my focus is on the central analytic nub of the Travel Ban majority, I will not analyze in any depth
the two concurring and two dissenting opinions, except as they bear on the core holding and implication of the
decision. But Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is largely devoid of analytic content, while Justice Thomas’s is
153
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5.

Consequences

Predictably, the numbers of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to nationals of
countries covered by the ban declined precipitously between 2016 and 2018. One study of visa
issuances to nationals of Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen suggests across-the-board
drops by more than 50 percent.159 More generally, the number of visas issued to individuals
from any country sharply declined in 2017.160 In tandem with the evidence of the infrequency
of waivers, this data suggests that so long as the travel ban is in effect, rates of movement from
the enumerated countries will remain minimal. Like the internment, the travel ban is an
effective agent of demographic purification.
The travel ban’s effect can also be decomposed by country. Figure 1 reports data on
the aggregate number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued for three countries that
have been on all three iterations of the ban (Iran, Yemen, and Syria) and two countries that
been on only one iteration of the ban (Chad and Iraq).
Figure 1: Changes in Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance
(March 2017-May 18)161
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largely focused on the distinct question of nationwide injunctions that was extraneous to the case’s resolution.
Id. at 2423 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2424-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s dissent was
focused on the need for additional factual consideration of the manner in which waivers under the order were
being allocated. Id. at 2330-31.
159 The impact of Trump’s travel ban, THOMSON REUTERS, June 26, 2018,
http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-COURT-IMMIGRATION/010070WB1TZ/index.html.
160 Nahal Toosi, Ted Hesson, & Sarah Frostenson, Foreign Visas Plunge under Trump, POLITICO, Apr. 4, 2018,
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/trump-travel-ban-visas-decline/.
161 This figure reports data from the Department of State web site
(https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics). The State Department does not
publicly report monthly data from prior to March 2017.
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These figures provide some sense of the scale and timing of the ban’s impact on the affected
nationalities, and show that for nationalities subject to the ban, its constraining effect is
substantial in relation to the ex ante flow of arrivals.
*

*

*

To summarize, both the statutory and the constitutional elements of the Travel Ban
Case have notable analytic weaknesses or inconsistencies with other bodies of doctrine. More
important—and the focus of the next Part—is how the decision’s central holding, and its
repudiation of Korematsu, will interact to generate new constraints, or new opportunities for
the discriminatory use of executive discretion.
II.

Between Internment and Exclusion

Constitutional doctrine does not abide in isolation. A solitary test, such as the rationalbasis standard articulated by the Travel Ban Case majority, draws sense from its relative
location within a wider network of doctrinal conjunctures and discontinuities. The meaning
of a ruling, that is, depends to some extent on the opportunities and limitations created by
consanguineous case-law.162 Even if its meaning cannot be reduced to a single point-estimate,
Constitutional law is not a “seamless web.” F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.Q.R. 13
(1898) (“Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavors to tell a piece of it must feel that his first
sentence tears a seamless web.”). Rather, there is a generative tension by the common lawyerly assumptions of
intradoctrinal coherence and coherence across constitutional domains on the one hand, and the contrary fact of
punctuated equilibriums in which changes to the larger political environment bleed into the jurisprudence
162
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a richer sense of doctrinal context can nevertheless delineate a limited range of potential legal
meanings. Hence it is important to understand how the decision to uphold the Travel Ban and
the decision to overrule Korematsu can be reconciled.
More specifically, understanding the interaction between those holdings163 is necessary
to two undertakings. First, it can illuminate the space for the discriminatory exercise of
discretion pursuant to Article II. Second, the calibration of that discretion will likely influence
the allocation of policy-making efforts by the executive branch, the consequent manner in
which federal institutions develop, and the extent to which they abet or hinder increasing social
stratification. I take up the first question in this Part; the second set of queries are the focus
of Part III.
I begin the analysis by isolating a series of five parallels between the JapaneseAmerican internment case and the Travel Ban Case. The existence of these continuities should
at minimum provoke uncertainty as to whether the cases from the 1940s are in fact
substantively distinct from the 2018 decision. From these similarities, I turn to three possible
margins along which the earlier trio of decisions can be distinguished from the later one. Each
of these margins is plausible in light of the verbal content of the Travel Ban majority
decision—and advocates seeking to cabin the latter would well rely on each of them. In
developing this argument, I focus not just on the possibility of doctrinal walls being thrown
up around the Travel Ban’s decision—but on the more practical question whether a distinction
in fact would constrain the government from taking action akin to internment or exclusion.
The possibility of substitution of doctrinal justifications for substantially similar policies, I
emphasize, saps a formal distinction of relevance and utility. And it turns out that—at least
where Article II powers are concerned—substitutability runs rampant.
A.

Continuities

There are a number of homologies in respect to the origins of and judicial responses
to the Japanese-American internment and the travel ban. The reasons for their adoption, the
kind of constitutional flaw at issue, the nature of the Court’s doctrinal response, and the most
persuasive underlying account of the moral wrong of both policies—all of these line up quite
precisely. As a result, correspondences can be discerned both between the policies of the 1940s
and 2017, and the judicial responses in the two eras.

through the appointment process, or through the anticipated response of Justices to anticipated political
hostility. This tension cannot be fully resolved; projections from the incomplete body of doctrinal materials are
therefore always provisional and subject to revision.
163 I assume that the majority’s treatment of Korematsu is a holding, rather than dicta, even though “the generally
accepted test provides little guidance” as to how to apply that distinction. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2041 (1994). The academic commentary contains two leading definitions of the
distinction. Compare id. at 2048 (“[I]f the Supreme Court announces a multipart rule, and the case before the
Court implicates only one part of the rule, the remaining portions would constitute dicta—at least so long as
they are not required to explain why the Court adopts the portion of the rule it does apply.”), with Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2005) (“A holding consists of those
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based
upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.”). One could reasonably take different views on
whether the Korematsu language is “required” to explain the case, or “based upon the facts of the case.”
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First, both were policies likely adopted on the basis of diffuse social prejudice against
a distinctive minority on the ground that the minority posed a distinctively large security threat.
The evidence of animus against Japanese–Americans, shared by decision-makers such as
Roosevelt, DeWitt, and California governor Earl Warren is by now well settled.164 In respect
to the Travel Ban, both the majority and the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor recited
a litany of presidential statements in which a categorical, derogatory characterization of a social
group is offered on the ground of a purported association of that group with the commission
of political violence. The majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts noted, if only obliquely,
the powerful evidence of invidious motive on the part of governmental actors.165 Only Justice
Thomas, in a casual aside, suggested an absence of discriminatory motive. 166 His negative
inference is starkly at odds with his willingness and eagerness, the very same week, to infer
prejudice from far more fragile evidence of animus, including one instance in which he read
an ambiguous, off-the-cuff comment by a single official to impugn a decision to which that
official’s views were not even necessary.167
A correlative of this commonality is that in both instances there was, in fact, no good
evidence inculpating members of the targeted populations as a risky totality. In the JapaneseAmerican internment case, there was “no consistent evidence either to allay or to affirm” fears
of Japanese American involvement in pro-Japanese activities.168 In the travel ban case, a study
by the New America Foundation of terrorism cases found that “while a range of citizenship
See supra note 62. On Warren, see NGAI, supra note 15, at 176. On DeWitt, see Acheson v. Murakami, 176
F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1949) (“The major reason for General DeWitt's deportation orders is his belief that
these citizens, descended of an eastern Asiatic race, can never be determined to be loyal Americans.”).
165 Chief Justice Roberts recited some of the “statements by the President and his advisers casting doubt on the
official objective of the Proclamation,” and quoted a range of contrasting endorsements of religious tolerance
by Washington, Eisenhower, and George W. Bush. Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417-18 (2018); see also id.
at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed
always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and
lasts.”).
166 Id. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]ven on its own terms, the plaintiffs' proffered evidence of antiMuslim discrimination is unpersuasive.”).
167 In Masterpiece Cakeshop. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court (with Justice Thomas in the
majority) invalidated a state administrative body’s finding that a bakery discriminated against a gay couple
seeking a wedding cake on the ground that one of its members said that “one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018). Justice
Thomas joined that opinion and wrote separately to say “the Commissioners' comments are certainly
disturbing,” but “the discriminatory application of Colorado's public-accommodations law is enough [to show
a constitutional violation].” Id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring). But the statement in question is at best
ambiguous: The commissioner plainly did not say religion was “despicable,” but that the use of religion as a
justification for harming others was “despicable.” Many religious people would fervently agree with the
sentiment. It is very hard to see how this can be seen as “disturbing” while President Trump’s numerous and
unequivocal statements are deemed insufficient evidence of discrimination. In his majority opinion in a First
Amendment challenge to a California regulation of certain pregnancy advice services, Justice Thomas pointed
to the “wildly underinclusive” scope of the state’s effort to suggest that raised a concern as to “whether the
government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or
viewpoint.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018). Four Justices who
joined that opinion wrote separately to say that saw no need to address viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 2378
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Again, Justice Thomas proved more willing to see discrimination than in the Travel
Ban Case. It is important to ask what justifies this asymmetrical willingness to perceive the possibility of
discriminatory motives.
168 NGAI, supra note 15, at 174. Efforts to gather evidence of incriminating radio signals from JapaneseAmerican communities had also failed by the time the internment was announced. Id. at 284.
164
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statuses are represented, every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States
since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident.”169 Only three nondeadly attacks have been carried
out in the United States by nationals of covered countries.170 To the extent that the risk at issue
is terrorism that causes a loss of life, therefore, the travel ban has no empirical basis.
Second, in both litigations, the challenge to the federal policy hinged on an allegation
of discriminatory intent. It did not turn, however, on the facial content of the rule. In both
instances, the challenged rule did contain a distinction based on national origin. But, in both
cases, this distinction was legally irrelevant to the constitutional question before the Court. At
the time of the Japanese-American internment cases, as noted, it was unclear whether the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause even included an antidiscrimination component. To the
extent that it did, however, there was simply no authority at the time for the application of
that rule to national origin.171 The Court had on one prior occasion invalidated a Nebraska
statute prohibiting the teaching of languages other than English as “arbitrary and without
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.”172 But this is a far cry from
treating nationality a suspect class.173 Indeed, the first time in which that occurred was the
Oyama case described in the Introduction—a case that is a direct legacy of the west coast
internment.174
In the Travel Ban Case, no allegation of unconstitutionality on the basis of national
origin discrimination was tendered. Rather, the facial validity of an order publicly advanced and
embraced on the basis of discriminatory motives was simply irrelevant to the Establishment
Clause question. Hence, in Larson v. Valente, the seminal precedent on denominational
preferences, the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute regulating charitable solicitations but
exempting “religious organizations that received more than half of their total contributions
from members or affiliated organizations ….” 175 The absence of a facial distinction between
some faiths and others (as opposed to a distinction based on nonreligious behavior such as
fund-raising habits) in the Minnesota statute did not save the measure from invalidation.
Chief Justice Roberts’s suggestion that the presence of facial discrimination in the
Japanese-American internment distinguishes it from the travel ban therefore is misleading.
Contrary to his opinion, the Japanese-American internment was not a government policy
executed “explicitly on the basis of race,” as opposed to national origin; and in any case it
cannot be distinguished from the travel ban on the basis of its verbal specification for the
simple reason that race was not “facially” present in either case.176 Rather, both the internment
of the 1940s and the exclusion of 2017 were predicated—facially and explicitly—upon national
Peter Bergen et al., New America Foundation, Part II: Who are the Terrorists? (2017),
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/
170 John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases (Jan. 2018),
https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf.
171 Yoshino, supra note 146, at 756 n.64.
172 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
173 Indeed, the Court had previously endorsed federal laws in the immigration domain with naked national
origin discrimination. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1983); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 16 to 27; Yoshino, supra note 146, at 756 n.64.
175 456 U.S. 228, 231 (1982).
176 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citations and internal cross references omitted).
169
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origin rather than race. Moreover, the Chief Justice’s prochronic errors do not end there:
Inasmuch as he suggests that the Korematsu Court erred by not focusing on the facial content
of the regulations, he condemns it for failing to apply a doctrinal test that was only applied
starting in the 1970s.177 His effort to say that the Japanese-American internment was different
because it discriminated by race on its face, therefore, falls short.
Third, the same standard of judicial review was employed, albeit with slightly variant
verbal expression, in both lines of cases. In the Travel Ban Case, the Court asked whether the
challenged policy was “related to the Government’s stated objective” and declined to look
beyond the superficial validity of the reasons proffered by the state.178 In the first Japanese
internment case, the Court asked whether there was “any substantial basis for the conclusion
… that the curfew … was necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage.”179 And
applying this standard, it underscored “the wide scope of judgment and discretion in
determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger.” 180 Using similar
language, Korematsu itself rested on the breadth of discretion awarded to the executive: “Here,
as in the Hirabayashi case … we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress [and] cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government
did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour” internment was necessary.181 What is
this but the plausibility rubric of 2018 avant la letter?
The fourth commonality is related to the relationship between the available facts and
the standard of review in both lines of cases. Given the known facts, the outcome of the
standard of review in both cases ought to have been, and indeed was in fact, the same: the
government winning. In both lines of cases there was a substantial national security threat
lurking in the background—albeit one that in fact existed independently of, and did not in any
meaningful way emanate from, the populations targeted by the coercive regulation. The form
of rationality review employed across all the cases scanned for the existence of a threat. But it
did not parse carefully the origin of the threat. Rather, under the operative standard of review,
which can be framed either as requiring a showing of “plausibility,”182 or as searching for a
“substantial basis”183 for the policy, it is enough for the government to identify some threat
without any evidence linking that threat to the coercively targeted population with precision
or predictive heft.
This claim may seem puzzling, given that I have pointed just now to the absence of
any evidence that the specific populations at issue in these two cases in fact posed a security
threat of any meaningful kind. But the key feature of the standard of review selected and
applied by the Court in the 1940s and again in 2018 was that it did not require the government
to produce such specific evidence. Rather, in both instances, the government was permitted
to rely on evidence that pertained to a security threat related only in a general sense to the
challenged policy. This general threat existed in both cases. In the months before the
internment order, “the prospect of a Japanese attack on the mainland could not be dismissed
Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 31.
138 S. Ct. at 2420.
179 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943).
180 Id. at 93.
181 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
182 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.
183 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95.
177
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out of hand” given attacks by Japanese submarines off the west coast, sinking two vessels in
December 1941. 184 Similarly, in the Travel Ban Case, there is no doubt that terrorist
organizations such as the Islamic State do, in fact, operate from Syria and Yemen.185
Hence, in both cases, the standard of review adopted by the Court obviated the need
for government lawyers to defend the substantive merits of the policy as actually applied. In
the Japanese-American internment case, government lawyers were “relieved” by a delay in the
briefing scheduled that gave them more time to prepare a defense of DeWitt’s key findings.186
In the Travel Ban Case, the Government was never put to the pains of making any showing
that the interagency process described in § 1 of the September 2017 order constituted a
genuine investigation of what travel-related measures were warranted, and whether the reasons
generated by that process were in fact relied upon.187 It was never asked why, some fifteen
years after the September 11 attacks, a barrier to entry of nationals who had not been involved
in those attacks, or indeed any other fatal assaults, should suddenly be kept from entering
American gates. The dissolving acid of deference, in both instances, ate completely away at
any demand for particularity as to whether these men, women, and children had acted in such
a way as to deserve coercion. Deference in turn invited the supervening intervention of a
malignant animosity clothed with the delusive garb of homiletic abstraction.
This emasculated standard of review was once the rule rather than the exception in
Equal Protection jurisprudence. Hence, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court tested the validity of
Louisiana’s requirement of separate “white” and “colored” railroad carriages by asking
whether it was “reasonable, and extend[ed] only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for
the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular
class.188 In a telling verbal precursor to Korematsu, the Plessy Court framed its conclusion in
terms of the difficulty of drawing a conclusion against the state.189 Similarly, in Williams v.
Mississippi, the Court upheld a suite of formally race-neutral restrictions that the state had
imposed on the franchise with the aim of excluding African-Americans because of the absence

IRONS, supra note 42, at 27. Such evidence was widely credited beyond the west coast. See, e.g., Pacific Coast
Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1942, at E2 (finding “ample proof to substantiate Pacific Coast fears”).
185 Shuaib Almosawa, Kareem Fahim & Eric Schmitt, Islamic State Gains Strength in Yemen, Challenging Al Qaeda,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1m0Gkep; President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on
ISIL (Sept. 10, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statementpresident-isil-1.
186 IRONS, supra note 42, at 285. Indeed, the Government lawyers in Korematsu waved a “red flag” of warning
about those facts, cautioning the Court “not … to take judicial notice” of DeWitt’s findings. Id. at 286 (citation
omitted).
187 Cf. The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2442 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.) (casting doubt on the integrity of that
process); supra footnote 104 (same).
188 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
189 Id. at 550-51 (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races
in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment than the acts of
congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia ….”).
184
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of a perfect fit between the regulated class and race.190 The Japanese-American internment
case and the Travel Ban Case inherit the logical structure of Plessy and Williams alike.191
The fifth and final point is the most crucial, if the most banal. The moral wrong of the
Japanese-American and the moral wrong of travel ban are consonant: In both cases, officials
acted upon an aversive and false stereotype to harm members of an ascriptive group because
of their membership in that group. There is, in truth, little mysterious or difficult about this
moral wrong. It is something “I and the public know/What all schoolchildren learn” the day
they see someone bullied because they wear the wrong phenotype, carry the wrong faith, or
love the wrong kind of person.192 If there was a moral wrong to Korematsu, Hirabayashi—and,
if my argument so far holds, the Travel Ban Case—it is failing to see, or to acknowledge
“[w]hat all schoolchildren know.” It is the kind of elementary error of moral arithmetic, in
short, that is so deeply rooted in the moral furniture of our lives, that it is hard to credit when
made by those who are charged with being our better and our wiser soul.
*

*

*

I began this section by noting the possibility of homologies between the two lines of
cases at stake here. In the biological sciences, a homology is a similarity of “complex structures
or patterns which are caused by a continuity of biological information.”193 I have demonstrated
here the existence of shared “complex structures” along five related margins. But are they due
to a “continuity of … information”? This is the question I take up now, by closely examining
the possible doctrinal justifications for distinguishing the two era’s cases.
B.

Distinctions (and the Lack Thereof)

Let us recap the stakes briefly here. In distinguishing the Japanese-American
internment cases and the Travel Ban Case, Chief Justice Robert drew on three distinctions.
The former (1) concerned “concentration camps,” and not “entry” to the country; (2) was
enacted “solely” and (3) “explicitly” on the “basis of race”; (4) was not “facially neutral”; and
(5) was not problematic simply because it was taken by a “particular President,” i.e., because
of an idiosyncratic motive.194
In developing the profound continuities between the two cases, I have demonstrated
that reasons (2), (3), (4) and (5) do not in fact work as distinctions. The Japanese-American
internment was not predicated “solely” on race: Not only did geographic location within the
170 U.S. 213, 222 (1896) (“[T]he operation of the constitution and laws is not limited by their language or
effects to one race. They reach weak and vicious white men as well as weak and vicious black men ….”).
Williams had argued that Mississippi law required that jurors be qualified voters, yet the state’s suffrage criteria
unconstitutionally excluded blacks.
191 Williams “drew upon a dominant tradition in constitutional law that held legislative motive to be irrelevant.”
Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 362 (1998).
192 W.H. Auden, September 1, 1939, in ANOTHER TIME (rev. ed. 2007). By no means am I the first to make this
sort of an argument. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424
(1960) (invoking “one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers - that of laughter” to answer the claim that
separate could be equal in America).
193 Gerhard Hanzpruzner, The type of homology and their significance for evolutionary biology and phylogenetics, 5 J
EVOLUTIONARY BIO. 24, 25 (1992).
194 The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
190
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U.S. play a role,195 but it was national origin rather than race that was the designating criterion,
much as it was for the travel ban. Both the travel ban and the key orders promulgated by
General DeWitt, moreover, contained explicit national origin distinctions on their face.196 So it
is not the case that one was “explicitly” non-neutral, and the other wasn’t. (And recall that
distinctions based on national origin did not trigger an Equal Protection concern until well
after the Japanese-American internment cases were decided).197 Rather, both defined a subset
of a suspect class—Japanese-Americans and Muslims, respectively—and subjected them to
intensified coercion. Finally, Chief Justice Roberts’s suggestion that motive was an issue for
the Travel Ban, and not for the Japanese-American internment, is at odds with the existence
of substantial evidence of individual motive in both cases. 198 In short, all but one of the
distinctions he seeks to draws falls flat.
I want to offer now three further distinctions, building on Roberts’s reason (1), for
distinguishing the Japanese-American internment cases from the Travel Ban Case. These are:
(a) the difference between internment and exclusion; (b) the difference between the
immigration power and the war power; and (c) the difference between citizens and noncitizens. In probing these points, I am not just trying to identify the formal boundary line
between the Japanese-American internment cases, and the Travel Ban Case’s holding. I am
also interrogating the latter’s domain. As I have argued, Chief Justice Robert’s core holding
rested upon the institutional presidency’s authority to exercise discretion de facto animated by
a discriminatory motive without scrutiny of, or a judicial response to, that motive. 199
Ascertaining how far this Article II discretion to discriminate extends is, at core, the central
project of this Part.
The short answer is ‘quite a lot further than one might have thought.’ I reject
distinctions (a) and (b) because they fail to accord either with the facts of the cases, or the
known facts of the world. I think the citizen/noncitizen distinction in (c) is the most
doctrinally plausible distinction. But other developments in the case-law have stripped that
distinction of much of its practical force: Even if the Travel Ban Case could be invoked against
a policy trained solely on citizens, I suggest, a weight of contrary precedent permits easy
circumvention. When placed within the larger doctrinal context of Article II jurisprudence,
there is no reason to think that an internment-like policy could not be implemented consistent
with the existing precedent in respect to citizens.
Note again the important qualification here: This is a claim about Article II and not
Article I. Both the Japanese-American internment and the Travel Ban Case concern executive
actions taken pursuant to statutes. Because they arise at the confluence of congressional and
executive action, it is not strictly possible to disentangle the separate penumbras of each
Japanese-Americans in Hawai’i, for example, were not interned because there were “too many … to be
moved.” Rostow, supra note 47, at 497.
196 See, e.g., Civilian Evacuation Order No. 1, March 24, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (1942).
197 See id.
198 Alternatively, Roberts’s reference to motive might be taken to suggest that motive should not have been
relevant to either case. It is hard to see the force of this point. To be sure, Korematsu was in accord with then
valid precedent holding that intent was not a touchstone of Equal Protection law. See supra text accompanying
note 61. But both Equal Protection and Establishment Clause jurisprudence now treat motive as a relevant
criterion. See Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 31 (discussing cases).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 131 to 132.
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Article. Nevertheless, while the Japanese-American internment presented to the courts in
terms of criminal infractions of a federal statute in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the criminal
statute at issue did not in fact ratify the internments. Rather, it extended to “whoever shall
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed,
under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any
military commander designated by the Secretary of War.”200 Hence, to the extent congressional
authority for the internment existed, it would have to be inferred by an aggressive reading of
a statute that by its own terms was relatively narrowly calibrated. Accordingly, to the extent
one reads Korematsu and Hirabayashi as cases concerning the internment itself, Article II alone
rather than bilateral political branch action is at stake.
In respect to the Travel Ban Case, it is striking to note that the Roberts Court has
viewed congressional action, when challenged in isolation from any ambitious use of executive
discretion, as subject to much more exacting scrutiny on antidiscrimination grounds. Consider
in this regard two examples. The first is the Court’s recent decision United States v. Windsor
invalidating § 2 of the Defense Against Marriage Act.201 The Windsor Court’s analysis focused
on whether that provision had the “purpose and effect of disproval of [a] class.”202 Yet this
kind of “purpose” inquiry was precisely what the Travel Ban Court disavowed. And four years
later—just twelve months before the Travel Ban Case—the Court in Sessions v. Morales-Santana
unanimously invalidated what it deemed a “stunningly anachronistic” provision of the INA
that treated unwed mothers and fathers differently for the purpose of establishing derivative
citizenship. 203 The Court did so, moreover, by rejecting the Government’s reliance on
precedent that provided architectonic support for the majority opinion in the Travel Ban
Case.204
The contrast between Windsor and Morales-Santana on the one hand, and the Travel
Ban Case on the other, suggests that a statute examined in isolation receives a different, more
intense kind of scrutiny than the exercise of executive discretion backed by a statute. 205
Moreover, the justifications offered for maintaining the scope of discretion to discrimination
in the Travel Ban Case were reasons that sound in the particular structure, design, and
operation of the executive branch, rather than Congress.206 Most tellingly, the Court in the
latter case directly invoked “the President's constitutional responsibilities in the area of foreign
affairs.”207
In short, given the Court’s more stringent treatment of Article I action simpliciter, and
its express invocation of exclusive Article II authority, any added quantum of discretionary
authority to discriminate in the Travel Ban Case can be explained only in terms of the
18 U.S.C.A. § 97a (quoted in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87–88 (1943)).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
202 Id. at 2693.
203 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017).
204 In Morales-Santana, id. at 1693-94, the Court rejected the Government’s reliance on Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977), whereas the Travel Ban Court cited it repeatedly as good authority, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418, 2420 (2018).
205 I do not think it is plausible to say that Windsor can be explained by a lower standard of review, since the
Court has not made sexuality a suspect trait; it is also hard to see why gender discrimination would receive less
careful scrutiny than religious bias.
206 Hence, the Court cited cases such as Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128
(2015). Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
207 Id. at 2419.
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additional involvement of executive branch actors. In discussing the discretion to discriminate
henceforth, I will therefore focus on its crucial Article II aspect.
1.

Internment v. Exclusion

The first potential cut point between the earlier and the later cases hinges on the
possibility that the Japanese-American internment cases involved “concentration camps,”
while the Travel Ban case involved exclusion, i.e., the rejection of persons at the border. This
distinction, however, is at odds with the facts of the case and belies the operation of the border
as a juridical form.
To begin with a somewhat pedantic point, neither Hirabayashi nor Korematsu concerned
the use of internment. Hirabayashi concerned the legality of a curfew order.208 The Korematsu
majority expressly and indignantly limited its ruling to the legality of an order to report to an
assembly center pursuant to a military order.209 Justice Black did not merely contort the facts
to avoid passing on internment.210 He also took marked exception to the dissent’s use of the
term “concentration camp”211 and cited Endo for the proposition that detention was a legally
distinct matter.212
But perhaps this is being too lawyerly. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is not repudiating
Korematsu for what it in fact held but for what it has come to stand for. On this reading—
which swaps out a legal distinction for one based on inchoate public understanding—Korematsu
is part of the “anti-canon” because it has come to stand in for internment writ large. 213
Rejecting Korematsu, the Travel Ban Court simply rejected that policy. It bears emphasis that
this is an exceedingly generous reading of the opinion.
The distinction between entry and internment, however, is far less crisp than first
appears. Presenting for entry at a U.S. border without what is deemed appropriate
documentation often leads immediately to detention. This has long been so. In a pair of cases
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-105 (1942).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221 (1944),
210 See supra text accompanying notes 66 to 69.
211 Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (“[W] e deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all
the ugly connotations that term implies.”), with id. at 226 (Roberts. J., dissenting) (characterizing the facts as a
“case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp,
based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry”). Was Black correct? There is no canonical definition
of a “concentration camp” that distinguishes it from other forms of civilian internment. Cf. DAN STONE,
CONCENTRATION CAMPS: A SHORT HISTORY 8-10 (217) (exploring this difficulty, and suggesting that the term
captures “a total abandonment of law and the creation of zones of exception”); Klaus Mühlhahn, The
Concentration Camp in Global Historical Perspective, 8 HIST. COMPASS 543, 544 (2010) (“[A] concentration camp is
an internment center outside the regular legal order and outside jus bellum.”). No doubt Black was correct that
the American camps were quite distinct from the Nazi camps that existed contemporaneously, STONE, supra at
34-56 (describing these camps’ development and uses), but that hardly removes the moral stain from them.
212 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222 (“[Endo] graphically illustrates the difference between the validity of an order to
exclude and the validity of a detention order after exclusion has been effected.”).
213 Hence, Greene’s recent article on the “anti-canon” treats Korematsu as synonymous with the internment,
even though Greene is far too careful a legal scholar to mistake the holding of that case. Greene, supra note 56,
at 457-58 (discussing Korematsu). Interestingly, writing some thirteen years before that, Primus does not include
Korematsu in his exemplary account of the anti-canon. Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent,
48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245 (1998) (“Lochner and Plessy are paradigmatic examples of what is not the law ….”).
208
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from the early 1950s, the Court permitted the indefinite detention of non-citizens arising
without necessary papers.214 The Government recently relied on those 1950s precedents in a
challenge to the practice of holding noncitizens without bond pending removal,215 a challenge
in which the Government prevailed on statutory grounds.216 The Government’s successful
reliance on that permitting indefinite detention of those arriving at the border, in the very same
Term that the Travel Ban Case was argued and decided undermines the idea that what has
been repudiated is internment (at least of noncitizens) as a per se matter.
Further, if we are not being legalistic, and instead if we understand Roberts to be
speaking frankly in the demotic to say that internment—the en masse civilian detention based
on status—is beyond the law, then we must still hesitate before the distinction he tries to carve.
For if we are speaking plainly, it is not a distinction that accords with practice in the world—
let alone practice that is blessed and embraced by the Court. Instead, we must recognize that
the border, and the manner of its enforcement, is intimately bound today with the practice of
internment. Indeed, if the wholesale relocation of populations employed during World War II
has a contemporaneous parallel, it is in the use of internment as an instrument of immigration
policy.
Consider just one element of immigration law that became highly salient in summer
2018: For almost the past two decades, the federal government has detained not just single
individuals but whole families arriving and claiming political asylum. 217 Some 18,378
immigration proceedings concerned individuals in family detention before 2001 and 2016; this
number is an undercount of the actual number of individuals in such detention during that
period. 218 Conditions in immigration detention are often, moreover, inhumane. 219 The
Department of Homeland Security’s fiscal year 2016 budgetary request noted that it
maintained 31,040 immigration detention beds for those presenting “flight risk.” 220 The
Department’s 2019 budgetary document requests funds for “52,000 beds (49,500 adult and
2,500 family).”221 In practice, therefore, the regulation of entry is an occasion for the coercive
infliction of detention of men, women and children at a scale not wholly dissimilar from the
Japanese-American internment.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
215 Brief for Petitioner at 19, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, No. 15-1204 (2018).
216 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (rejecting statutory challenge to the use of detention without
bond hearings, but remanding for consideration of constitutional question).
217 The authority to detain derives in the first instance from 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); see 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a)
(authorizing the Attorney General to detain certain aliens past the initial ninety-day removal period).
218 Ingrid Eagly et. al., Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CAL. L. REV. 785,
803 (2018).
219 Id. at 794, 829-30; see also Anonymous, What my Six-Year Old Son and I Endured in Family Detention, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/opinion/family-detention-immigration.html.
220 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2016, at 54 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.
221 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., FY 2019 Budget in Brief 5 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf. En masse detention of
immigrants is a relatively new phenomenon. In 1985, for example, only 5,000 people were held in immigration
detention of all kinds. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CAL. L.
REV. 1449, 1466 (2015); see also Cody Mason, The Sentencing project, Dollars and detainees: The Growth of For-Profit
Detention 3 (2012), http://sentencingprqject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf
(documenting such growth).
214
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Of course, this is not a distinctly American phenomenon.222 The internment “citycamp” is rather the modal response to global waves of migration generated by civil strife and
ethnic cleaning.223 Rather than spaces of absolute exclusion from a polity, they are often liminal
zones in which not only “segregating and exclusionary,” but also integrative activities unfold.224
Such practices are striking in a liberal democratic context, where it is not always clear the idea
of a border as colloquially understood can be sustained while also maintaining a commitment
to liberal values, broadly understood. Under those conditions, the distinction between
internment and entry regulation, in short, is unfaithful not just to the actual logic of the cases
but also to the actuality of today’s “violent” borders.225 It does not provide an adequate way
to reconcile the Travel Ban Case’s two holdings.
2.

Immigration v. War

But perhaps the distinction between internment and exclusion is pitched at the wrong
level of generality. Instead, it may be more useful to look to the nature of the governmental
authority, and to posit differently calibrated “internal limits” to distinguish the JapaneseAmerican internment and the travel ban. 226 Indeed, the cases were decided pursuant to
different constitutional powers. But this distinction is not one that can support the legal
difference that the Court sought to established.
In both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, there is citation to“[t]he war power of the national
government,” characterized using Charles Evans Hughes’ terminology as “the power to wage
war successfully.” 227 As Matthew Waxman has recently documented, Hughes’s “original
statement in 1917 of the ‘power to wage war successfully’ was about Congress's constitutional
authority,” and not about the president.228 Indeed, the other major wartime case in which
Hughes’s dictum was invoked plainly concerned the scope of congressional authority in
respect to certain government contracts. 229 As I have explained, while Hirabayashi and
Korematsu may have concerned criminal violations of a federal statute, no statute directly and

In 2018, the world’s largest refugee camps were located in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, and Bidi Bidi, northern
Uganda. Raptim, World’s Largest Refugee Camps in 2018, June 7, 2018, https://www.raptim.org/largest-refugeecamps-in-2018/.
223 Michel Agier, Between war and city: Toward an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps, 3 ETHNOGRAPHY 317, 320
(2002).
224 Nando Sigone, Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space, 19 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 1, 13 (2015)
(reporting findings from an ethnographic study of camps of Roma expelled from the Balkans).
225 Cf. OWEN JONES, VIOLENT BORDERS: REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT TO MOVEMENT (2017) (arguing that it is
the legal regime of borders and their enforcement that produce violence, and that borders are not somehow
‘naturally’ violent places).
226 For the use of this term to characterize executive power, see Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in
Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1298 (1988).
227 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the
Constitution, 42 A.B.A.Rep. 232, 238 (1917); accord Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Since Korematsu expressly relies on Hirabayashi as precedent, id. at 217, it is safe to
treat both opinions as resting on the same theory of constitutional power.
228 Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Wage War Successfully, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 618 (2017).
229 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 746 (1948) (evaluating “the constitutionality, on its face, of the
Renegotiation Act insofar as it is authority for the recovery of the excessive profits sought to be recovered by
the United States”).
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explicitly authorized the internments themselves. 230 Moreover, as glossed by Waxman,
Hughes’ account of constitutional war powers emphasized flexibility but within certain legal
parameters, such that “interpretations of powers and rights [could] expand or contract but
some particular structural processes never change.” 231 It is far from clear that Hughes’s
principle, at least as originally intended, would have allowed the generation ex nihilio, of Article
II authority to intern civilians.
The Travel Ban Case, in contrast, rested explicitly on the president’s authority over
“the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals,” which it characterized as a “fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
judicial control.”232 In addition, the Court underscored an “overlapping … national security”
authority reposed specifically in the President as a justification for limited judicial review.233
But it is hard to see why this immigration power could go further, and hence allow
more varieties of discrimination, than the power to wage war successfully. In both cases, it is
plausible to think that the President’s authority over national security and foreign affairs had
been successfully (even if not properly) invoked to justify a discriminatory act. If anything, I
think the intuition should be that the invocation of the war power, in the wake of a major
assault on U.S. soil and a congressional declaration of war, would sweep more broadly than
any corresponding immigration authority. Thus, it is telling that Hughes would speak of the
power to wage war successfully, and not the power to establish borders successfully. Nor does
the case law, including recent decisions such as Morales-Santana, suggest that the immigration
power is as elastic as the war power.234 To the contrary, the Court has rejected the idea that
the immigration power is “so plenary that any agent of the National Government may
arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to
citizens.”235 Although the rights of noncitizen residents are greater than those of nonresidents,
even nonresident aliens standing at the nation’s threshold are not wholly bereft of
constitutional rights against the arbitrary operation of immigration powers.236
No such analog right obtains in respect to the war power. To the contrary, it is telling
that a person targeted in the executive pursuit of national security ends is typically bereft of
any opportunity to challenge the quality of official motives either before or after the fact. In
challenges to detention policies adopted after the September 11, 2001 attacks, for example,
the Court defined federal authority to coerce in broad terms.237 It then eliminated ex post
platforms to challenge discriminatory uses of such prophylactic authority. Hence, in Ashcroft
See supra text accompanying notes 41 to 44.
Waxman, supra note 228, at 635 (giving, as an example, the requirement that “legislation still requires the
same majority bicameralism and presidential signature to become law”).
232 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
233 Id. at 2419 (2018) (noting that “[j]udicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises concerns for the
separation of powers” by intruding on the President's constitutional responsibilities in the area of foreign
affairs” (citation and quotation marks omitted).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 203 to 204.
235 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976).
236 See, e.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 459 (1920) (rejecting exclusion on due process grounds);
Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1915) (same); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)
(noncitizens cannot be put to hard labor before being deported).
237 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 739 (2011) (holding that the subjective reasons for which a
material witness warrant was employed are irrelevant to its legality).
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v. Iqbal, the Court declined to permit a discrimination claim against cabinet officials to proceed
based on allegations of disparate targeting,238 despite ample evidence that “the race or religion
of individuals drove many investigative and arrest decisions in the wake of the September 11
attacks.”239 Eight years later in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court more broadly extinguished the right
to damages for constitutional violations inflicted in the course of a mass roundup of suspects
in the 2001 attacks’ wake.240 As one commentator noted “there was a racial dimension to the
roundup in Ziglar that is reminiscent of what occurred in Korematsu.”241 Ziglar was decided a
year before the Travel Ban Case. The Chief Justice as well as Justices Kennedy, Alito, and
Thomas joined both majorities. Their repudiation of Korematsu must be read, and discounted,
in light of the policy Ziglar countenanced.
If the war power a priori is more robust and permits greater discretion than the
immigration power, it would seem that the Japanese-American internment cases cannot be
relegated to the space of the anti-canon, while the travel ban is preserved, on the ground that
the federal government has more authority during wartime than over noncitizens. Hence, it
cannot be the source of constitutional authority that reconciles the travel ban’s legality and the
Japanese-American internment’s unconstitutionality.
3.

Citizen v. Noncitizen

The final distinction between the travel ban and the Japanese-American internment
hinges on the fact that the former targets noncitizens exclusively, whereas the latter is
conventionally analyzed in terms of its effects on citizens. Citizenship was expressly part of
the rationale offered by the Travel Ban Court majority, which characterized the “forcible
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps” as an “objectively unlawful” practice.242
Although the Court did not elaborate on this point, it might have observed that even Justice
Black, Korematsu’s author, would acknowledge five years after that decision the national
government’s distinctively “broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be
admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.” 243 More recently, the
Court has affirmed the impermissibility of most alienage distinctions when made by states,244
556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009) (“It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement
to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor
Muslims.”). The Iqbal opinion, moreover “rests on [a] plainly erroneous racial miscategorization” of the
plaintiff as “Arab” rather than “Pakistani.” Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 225, 250–51 (2009). Rather than repudiating the use of overbroad stereotypes, that is, the Iqbal Court
reenacted them.
239 Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 383 (2017).
240 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856-57 (2017).
241 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to Redress, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167, 2179
(2018).
242 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (emphasis added).
243 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (invalidating California law limiting right to
commercial fishing to citizens). But at the time of the Japanese-American internment cases, even states could
discriminate against aliens, provided they did not do so in “plainly irrational” ways. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274
U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding a Cincinnati ordinance that limited the issuance of pool hall licenses to
citizens).
244 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (describing aliens as a “discrete and insular minority,”
and subjecting certain alienage distinctions by states to strict scrutiny); see also Examining Bd. of Eng'rs,
238
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but left the federal government with broad discretion as a class to regulate noncitizens as
such.245
Of all the possible distinctions to be carved between the internment and the travel ban
for constitutional purposes, I think that citizenship is the one that is most consistent with the
otherwise prevailing doctrine, and the one that is likely to prove the most stable. I anticipate
that when the Court comes to construe its Travel Ban precedent, it will treat citizenship as the
dividing line between what is permitted and what falls beyond the pale. But that is not to say
that citizenship is an analytically or functionally satisfying line; it is rather the best of a rather
bad lot. In my view, a citizenship distinction between the internment and the travel ban ought
to be viewed with skepticism for three reasons: it does not fit the facts of the actual cases; it
sits uncomfortably with the law; and it does not map accurately the limits of the federal
government’s coercive authority.
First, it is just false as a matter of fact to say that the internment affected only citizens
while the travel ban affected only noncitizens. As previously noted, about a third of those
confirmed in the interior in 1942-45 were not U.S. citizens. 246 This is not necessarily an
embarrassment for Chief Justice Roberts’s claim that citizenship bounds the permissible
discretion to discriminate from unconstitutionality; the detention of roughly 30,000 noncitizens might have been a lawful supplement to a broadly unlawful policy.247 But to the extent
that his argument is glossed as a demotic rather than a legalistic one, intended to repudiate the
Japanese-American internment and its judicial benediction, it seems rather troubling to
observe that his rationale implicitly exempted roughly one third of the actual detentions from
the ambit of his condemnation. Such a repudiation would be, if not hollow, than not an entirely
candid one.
More seriously, it is not the case that the travel ban solely affected the rights of aliens.
Indeed, the Court’s own standing analysis, as well as its substantive Establishment Clause
argument turned on the fact that there were citizens who had been materially harmed by the
executive branch’s action. 248 The travel ban, it should be recalled, prohibited family
reunification. The harms thereby inflicted on U.S. citizens kept apart from families who remain
trapped in physically perilous environments are very far from trivial.249 Both as a matter of fact
and of law, therefore, U.S. citizens fall within the perimeter of those harmed by the travel ban

Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602-06 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down
a Puerto Rico statute requiring an applicant for registration as a licensed engineer to be a U.S. citizen).
245 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 628
(2008) (“[W]hereas state distinctions between citizens and noncitizens are subject to strict scrutiny, such
distinctions drawn by the federal government are subject to only rational basis review.”).
246 See supra text accompanying note 49.
247 “Enemy aliens” have been treated as a distinct category amenable to detention in times of war since 1789.
See An Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Enemy Act), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 21-24).
248 See, e.g., The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (noting that “an American individual who has “a
bona fide relationship with a particular person seeking to enter the country ... can legitimately claim concrete
hardship if that person is excluded” (citation omitted)).
249 Mallor Moench, U.S. Citizen’s Family Denied Visas Under Trump’s Travel Ban. Then He Died By Suicide, NBC
NEWS, July 28, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-citizen-s-family-was-denied-visas-undertrump-n895381.
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in ways that cast doubt on the validity of a citizenship distinction between it and the JapaneseAmerican internment.
Second, it is not at all clear that citizenship marks, or at least should mark, the outer
boundary of protection for the right against religious discrimination. Religious identity is a
suspect class pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and presumably under the equality
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.250 The Equal Protection Clause
has been understood to extend to noncitizens as much as citizens since 1884. 251 While
distinctions based on national origin might have a distinct relevance to immigration regulation
so as to warrant a milder form of judicial scrutiny,252 it is difficult to see why the same should
be so of religion or race.253 The idea that citizenship should mark the perimeter against the
form of discrimination alleged to be at issue in the Travel Ban Case, therefore, is highly
suspect.
Third, if the Roberts Court’s repudiation of the Japanese-American internment was
intended to generate a sense of security among citizens that they stand beyond the reach of
any troublesome Article II discriminatory coercion, it should be cold comfort. In a range of
contexts, the Court has been confronted with Article II claims of discretionary authority to
coerce without ex ante justification in respect to citizens. None of these cases involve religious
discrimination, but some concern discrimination based on political viewpoint. Across these
cases, the Court has suggested that where the federal government invokes a national security
justification, it has an almost wholly free hand in exercising discretion without being secondguessed for discriminatory reasons.
The judicial affirmation of Article II authority to coerce citizens begins with cases
concerning the issuance of U.S. passports, which can be denied based on viewpoint differences
on the ground that “[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.254 In a decision cited by the Travel Ban Court,

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Treating religion as a suspect class for Equal
Protection purposes has a number of different consequences from its treatment under the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses. See Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 395–96
(2012) (noting tension between colorblindness regime under Equal Protection and the formal neutrality rule
under the First Amendment). For present purposes, my point is more narrowly that alienage very clearly does
not obviate Equal Protection antidiscrimination rights under existing doctrine.
251 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-59 (1886) (recognizing that the reference to “any person” in the
Equal Protection Clause included aliens).
252 Indeed, national origin distinctions in the immigration context need only have a rational basis, see Narenji v.
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
253 This is especially so given the Court’s increasing willingness to apply full-bore constitutional scrutiny to
gender distinctions in the immigration context. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017).
Even though gender-based distinctions “have long shaped the composition of the American polity,” Kristin A.
Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 171 (2017), the pedigree
of history did not legitimize the persistence of discrimination today. Hence, the fact that immigration regulation
has long hinged on implicit religious distinctions should be of no moment. For a famous invocation of religion
as a touchstone for immigration regulation, see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471
(1892) (Brewer, J.) (“[T]his is a Christian nation ….”).
254 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
250
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executives’ suppression of citizens’ speech based on viewpoint has been permitted, again on
national security grounds, notwithstanding the First Amendment’s free speech commitment.255
Nor are citizens immune from being detained on national security grounds in the
absence of a criminal adjudication,256 or from being transferred to another nation’s custody
where they may be not only detained but subject to torture.257 The retail power to detain, and
even transfer to another sovereign for detention, hence certainly exists in respect to individual
citizens; it is far from clear why such power could not be exercised at the wholesale level.258
Here, we see one way in which the distinction between the immigration and the war power
might have implications for the Court’s purported distinction—but not perhaps the intended
ones. That is, even if the immigration power cannot be a wellspring for an institutional discretion
free to be used against citizens in a discriminatory fashion without a judicial check, it is far
from clear that the war power cannot be deployed as a source of the same discretion amenable
to discriminatory use without judicial superintendence in precisely the same way. The
distinction that the Travel Ban Case gestured toward to cabin the Japanese-American
internment cases may instead provide a ground for their wider application.
Finally, to speak of a citizenship line assumes that the demarcation between citizenship
and its absence is a firm one, which has not always been the case. It was only in the 1950s that
the Court imposed constraints on denaturalization, 259 and only recently did it gloss the
statutory denaturalization provisions to preclude citizenship stripping on “meager,” or clerical,
grounds. 260 Given the federal government’s success in eliciting ‘voluntary’ citizenship
renunciations among the interned Japanese-Americans, especially those held in the harsh
conditions of Tule Lake,261 it might reasonably be doubted that these constraints will always
The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010), for the principle of broad deference to the executive’s judgment on national security and foreign affairs
matters). More generally, it is almost impossible for litigants to challenge the discriminatory use of criminal
prosecutions. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459, 470 (1996); Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1566–67 (2018) (providing practical and doctrinal reasons for anticipating the unbounded
and unregulated use of prosecutorial discretion in practice).
256 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion) (authorizing detention of a U.S. citizen as
an “enemy combatant”).
257 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 694 (2008) (affirming “sovereign right” of another sovereign to prosecute a
U.S. citizen, and to have then held in custody for transfer)
258 Detainees might have access to a federal court to challenge the legal basis of their detention. In practice,
such civil proceedings have not have a significant effect on detention practices concerning noncitizens. See
Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 501-11 (2017) (documenting the limited
effect of habeas review in military detention cases). The empirical scholarship thus suggests that judicial review
via habeas corpus does not impose significant costs on detention.
259 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967) (rejecting “Congress’ power to take away a man's citizenship
because he voted in a foreign election”); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (invalidating on Equal
Protection grounds a statute that stripped citizenship from naturalized citizens who resided overseas for more
than three years on “the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear
less allegiance to this country than do the native born”).
260 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1927 (2017) (“The statute [Congress] passed, most naturally
read, strips a person of citizenship not when she committed any illegal act during the naturalization process,
but only when that act played some role in her naturalization.).
261 For an account of the renunciations, see Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community
Among “We the People,” 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 242-47 (1997). Some of the renunciations were subsequently
challenged and voided as coerced. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1949).
255
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prove practicably availing.262 A right that in practice can be predictably bought off by the threat
of ill-willed state coercion, though, is really not much of a right at all.
*

*

*

In sum, even the most robust of the distinctions between the Japanese-American
internment and the travel ban as exercises of an Article II discretion to discriminate—
citizenship—is a fragile one. It fails to track the facts of either case. It makes a hash of the
applicable Equal Protection jurisprudence, and—most importantly—masks the basic
vulnerability of citizens to a range of coercive measures that can be employed using a
discriminatory discretion. The scope of the Article II discretion to discriminate, therefore, is
open-textured in the sense of no clearly marked outer perimeter.
To be clear, this does not mean that a policy akin to the Japanese-American internment
is likely to be adopted today, or that, if adopted, it would meet no judicial hesitation. My aim
here has been to show more modestly that there is no simple way to reconcile the Travel Ban
Case’s two holdings. A correlate of that difficulty is that efforts to cabin the Article II
discretion to instances akin to the travel ban are unlikely to be availing. Certainly, such
discretion exceeds the regulation of noncitizen entry to the United States. It also extends
beyond the federal government’s immigration powers to include its power to wage war. And
at least arguably, it extends beyond the treatment of noncitizens, and characterizes certain
armatures of citizenry regulation. To be clear, this is not to say that all or most exercises of
official discretion will be, or even are likely to be, characterized by motives that would
otherwise be condemned as discriminatory in other domains. Rather, the point is that there is
only an evanescent and permeable barrier against that possibility
III.

The Article II Discretion to Discriminate

The central legacy of the Travel Ban Case is its formal recognition of an open-textured
Article II discretion to discriminate. Judicial recognition of this discretion arises from the
Court’s cleavage between “the statements of a particular President,” and “the authority of the
Presidency itself.” 263 It arises from the majority’s explicit recognition of the ample
documentation of invidious grounds for the travel ban, and its implicit recognition of their
impermissibility—and its subsequent refusal to account for those reasons so long as a
“plausibl[e]” reason could be given for the ban.264 It is difficult to think of any other instance
in which the Court has recognized the impermissible motives for a policy’s adoption—and then
upheld the policy anyway.265
By privileging what the executive ought to be, and by giving short shrift what it was in
plain sight for all to see, the Court elevated what Walter Bagehot called the “dignified” over
Cf. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Trump administration now has naturalized citizens in its sights, THE HILL, July 17, 2018,
http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/396923-trump-administration-now-has-naturalized-citizens-in-itssights (documenting creation of a taskforce within the Department of Homeland Security to accelerate the rate
of denaturalizations).
263 The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018); see supra text accompanying notes 130 to 131.
264 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
265 I read the Court in roughly analogous instances to avoid the recognition of unconstitutional reasons, and not
to say that unconstitutional reasons are present and simply do not matter.
262
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the “efficient” presidency. 266 Because the dignified presidency works as a shield against
constitutional challenges to the motives of executive branch actors, it works here as the
outward, legitimizing aspect of a license to discriminate against suspect classes. For even if a
discretion to discriminate cannot be openly condoned, the dignified presidency can be publicly
embraced without cavil or apology. It can be, in extremis, the sober face of hate. In its original
manifestation, of course, the idea of a dignified reading of the constitution had a different
valence. Writing in mid-nineteenth century England, Bagehot confronted a system formally
characterized by absolute parliamentary sovereignty, but in fact dominated by “ministers
meeting in Cabinet” who could “get all the legislation they wanted and govern without let or
hindrance.”267 The dignified English constitution, on his account, was a “noble lie” shielding
this benevolent system from the hoi polloi’s demands. If the contemporary Court’s validation
of the dignified presidency over the actual presidency is a new “noble lie,” its relations to
populist sentiment and social welfare are more ambiguous.
This Part excavates the legal justifications and the forward-facing consequences of the
Article II discretion to discriminate. My aim is to enable a critical appreciation of what the
Court has wrought, and what it bodes for the nation. A necessary caveat to this analysis is that,
as Part II presaged, the boundaries of this discretionary authority are not easily demarcated.
My effort to reconcile the Court’s validation of the travel ban and its condemnation of the
Japanese-American internment, in other words, suggested that it will be difficult to inscribe a
principled bound on the scope of such discretion. My analysis here does not aim to resolve
that uncertainty. I assume here that the boundaries of the discretionary authority at stake here
are open-textured in the sense of being ambiguous. Meaningful analysis can still proceed on
the assumption that the discretion covers a large domain beyond the narrow category of entry
to the United States, or even immigration more generally.
I begin by analyzing potential justifications for canonizing the dignified presidency,
drawing on traditional tools of constitutional analysis. Accounting for a formalist account of
the decision, and then two alternative functionalist justifications, I conclude that the Court’s
conjunction of the dignified presidency with the discretion to discriminate has deeply flawed
foundations. Concluding, I turn to the downstream consequences of the Article II discretion
to discriminate suggest that these yield no better comfort. Paradoxically, the Court’s effort to
grant the executive with operational discretion to pursue needful policies is likely to drive a
flight to worse rather than better policies.

BAGEHOT, supra note 131, at 7 (distinguishing between those parts of a constitution that excite and preserve
the reverence of the population,” and the element that “in fact, works and rules”).
267 Robert Colls, The Constitution of the English, 46 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 97, 99-101 (1998).
266
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A.

Justifications

The Travel Ban Court’s refusal to look beyond the dignified façade presented by “the
authority of the Presidency itself” 268 to the actions of specific office holders seems to be based
on an uneasy compound of what in separation-of-powers scholars call “formalist” and
“functionalist” reasons.269 Chief Justice Roberts’s account is “formalist” in the sense that it
derives a relatively strict rule of separation,270 implicitly based on a categorization of actions
“as ‘legislative,’ ‘executive,’ or ‘judicial.’”271 It diverges from formalism insofar as it does not
rely on the “conventional meaning of the text.”272 Rather, in asserting that the Court is dealing
with “matters [that] may implicate ‘relations with foreign powers,’ or involve ‘classifications
defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,’” Roberts appeals to
the functionalist idea that the executive is more competent than the judiciary to make firstorder policy judgments.273 The argument, in short, blends formalist and functionalist elements
in ways that undermine the utility of that distinction as a way of categorizing judicial
decisions.274
Rather than ignoring either strand of Roberts’s argument, I consider first a formalist
and then two different functionalist justifications for the Article II discretion to discriminate.
In respect to the latter, I highlight separately the historical reasons and the institutional
competence grounds for not looking beyond the presidency’s dignified façade.
1.

Formalism

The modal formalist argument in separation-of-powers jurisprudence concerns the
location of an official act. Canonical formalist opinions hence invalidate official actions on the
ground that they were taken by the ‘wrong’ branch.275 This textualism version of formalism

Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (distinguishing between “a formalistic approach to separation-of-powers
issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government (and
consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries), and a functional approach that stresses core function
and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened”).
270 Id.
271 Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 690 (1997).
272 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers As Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1958 (2011)
(“Conventional wisdom further holds that, in contrast with functionalism, formalism calls upon interpreters to
adhere to the conventional meaning of the text instead of resorting to the broad purposes underlying it.”).
273 138 S. Ct. at 2418
274 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 355
(2016) (expressing skepticism that a binary distinction between formalism and functionalism can usefully
explain the Court’s separation-of-powers cases); Victoria F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56
STAN. L. REV. 835, 899 (2004) (explaining that formalism is often predicated on functionalist justifications).
275 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding that Congress may not vest power to execute
budget reduction legislation in an officer who is not entirely within the President's removal power); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983) (holding that Congress may act legislatively only in accordance with
bicameralism and presentment procedure, and may not attempt through legislative veto to interfere with the
President's execution of immigration laws).
268
269
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has little explanatory force in respect to the Travel Ban Case, though, because neither Article
I nor Article II mention an immigration power.276
Alternatively, a formalist Court can negate one branch’s action (e.g., a federal statute)
on the ground that the action impinged upon the domain or powers of a second branch.277
The Travel Ban majority’s argument for the dignified presidency, however, cannot wholly turn
on a formalist argument about the appropriate location of immigration policy as between
Congress and the executive. Indeed, as I have noted, the Travel Ban Court did not crisply
distinguish between the scope of legislative and executive authority. It offered instead a
blended, “unitary conception of immigration authority”278 that shaded imperceptibly into a
functionalist argument based on the prototypical expertise and competencies of the executive
branch.279
A formalist logic of the appropriate locus of an official action, nevertheless, might
explain the Court’s decision to adopt a “deferential standard of review” in respect to the terms
upon which § 212 authority is employed.280 A formalist argument to this effect would start
from the premise that judicial intrusion into a domain exclusively reserved for the presidency
was itself a violation of the Separation of Powers. The Solicitor General, indeed, made this
argument.281 The Court expressly declined to adopt the posture of nonjusticiability he urged.282
But the Court’s elevation of the dignified presidency, with its concomitant grant of wide
discretion to discriminate, might be read as a sotto voce endorsement of the Solicitor General’s
position.
The problem with this argument is that there is nothing in the Court’s opinion to
explain why it viewed judicial superintendence of immigration policy as constitutionally
improper. Other policies, including the controversial deferred action program installed by
President Obama, do not appear to have received deference that functioned akin to a
nonjusticiability rule.283 Nor can that division of constitutional labor be inferred from the text
Indeed, for roughly a century, immigration regulation was a state matter, not a federal matter. GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-49
(1996) (discussing the centrality of state regulation during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century).
Another possibility, the Take Care Clause of Article II, provides insufficient guidance to be a plausible source
of authority. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836
(2016) (noting that the Take Care Clause has been glossed “either as a source of vast presidential power or as a
sharp limitation on the powers of both the President and the other branches of government”).
277 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015) (endorsing, on formalist grounds, and
“[a]s a matter of constitutional structure,” the principle of “the President[’s] control over recognition
decisions”).
278 Cox and Rodríguez, supra note 133, at 469.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 11. The leading account of the jurisprudence finds evidence of both
a delegation model and an inherent Article II model of immigration powers. Cox and Rodríguez, supra note
133, at 482 (“Perhaps the President has some Article II authority over immigration at the same time that
Congress possesses regulatory authority under Article I, such that the President could act in the immigration
arena without statutory authorization.”).
280 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018).
281 Gov’t Brief, supra note 114, at 17 (arguing that a “fundamental separation-of-powers principle” foreclosed
any review of a decision “to exclude aliens abroad generally”).
282 Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2407.
283 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming a preliminary injunction against
a deferred action program).
276
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of the Constitution. The latter does not textually specify the immigration power as an attribute
of either Article I or Article II. And even if the text did, it is worth recalling that the rule in
the Travel Ban Case was not limited to entry decisions, or even immigration. So a subjectspecific nonjusticiability justification cannot wholly explain the language or scope of the
decision. If there is a justification for prioritizing the dignified over the efficient constitution,
therefore, it cannot be explained in formalist terms. Rather, it must appeal to one or another
species of functionalist argument.
2.

Functionalism and History

A first species of functionalist argument is Burkean in character: Presidents, this
argument runs, have been exercising broad discretion without judicial superintendence to
catch discriminatory actions in certain fields. This arrangement has generated sound policies
without excessive discriminatory harms being inflicted. In this context, a Burkean logic of
epistemic modesty counsels in favor of constrained judicial intervention. 284 Deference to
executive-branch judgments is warranted simply because it has worked tolerably well in the
past. A variant on the same logic points to the history of executive superintendence of
immigration and national security as a source of accumulated knowledge and insight that the
judiciary lacks. History, the argument goes, has generated expertise within the executive, and
this in turn is the basis for deference.
These arguments are usefully considered closely in the immigration domain, even if
the scope of the Article II discretion to discriminate spills over into other contexts, since that
is the heartland of the Travel Ban Court’s analysis. Although a complete reckoning of U.S.
immigration policy over time is beyond the scope of this paper, a cursory overview of
immigration enforcement trends belies the idea that improper stereotypes have not played a
significant role in enforcement actions. It is by no means clear that history vouchsafes the
efficiency of unsupervised executive discretion.
To begin with, it is well known that immigration statutes have been infected by racial
and racist judgments since Congress began intervening in 1875. The first immigration statutes
openly targeted Chinese migration to the west coast out of racist fears.285 Early twentieth
century statutory immigration law was so “manifestly ‘race-based,’ favoring the ‘Nordics’ of
northern and western Europe” that it became an important model for Nazi lawyers drafting
the Nuremberg laws. 286 Racial criteria persisted as part of statutory immigration law until
1952. 287 It would be startling indeed if the extent and duration of hierarchal racial ideas
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 456-57 (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1999) (urging due regard for the “collective wisdom of the ages”).
285 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 1, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (regulating “the immigration of any
subject of China, Japan or any Oriental country,” to prevent, inter alia, immigration “for lewd and immoral
purposes”).
286 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE
LAW 35-36 (2017). Strikingly, Whitman recounts how Hitler in Mein Kampf accurately described American
immigration laws and posited them as a “racial model.” Id. at 46. It is hard to imagine how enforcement actions
could avoid being tainted by animus given this backdrop.
287 Until 1952, only races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere were made eligible for naturalization.
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 3, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140 (repealed 1952); see also Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of
Race in American Immigration Law: The Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST. 67, 81 (1999)
(illustrating the influence of racial ideas in the pivotal 1924 Johnson-Reed Act).
284

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239976

46
embodied in statutes did not seep into the institutional orientation and values of immigration
agencies. Charged with the invigilation of racist immigration statutes, those agencies are likely
to have internalized as a matter of culture and orientation some of the norms embedded in
the statutory regime. Absent other evidence, it seems unreasonable to assume that those
agencies are not oriented in part toward the preservation of prevailing racial norms.
Worse, the flow of discriminatory ideas ran in both directions. Ideas of racial hierarchy
were elicited and disseminated by experts within the administrative apparatus. In a recent
book, Katherine Benton-Cohn has documented how the Dillingham Commission, formed in
1907, purportedly a receptacle of “nonpartisan expertise” within the burgeoning
administrative state, sharpened the binary distinction between “old,” largely northern
European, immigrants and “new” immigrants from elsewhere in the world.288 This distinction
has “continued to structure immigration policy and to produce a racial subtext about ‘illegal
aliens’ to the present day.” 289 Even after formal statutory law was scrubbed of racial
distinctions, enforcement continued to have a racialized tenor. In the 1930s, for example, the
Immigration and National Service (“INS”) conducted an aggressive repatriation campaign
against Filipinos grounded in what the then Attorney General described as the principle of
“Government of and for the White Race.”290 Similarly, in the early 1950s, INS commissioner
general Joseph Swing railed against “disease-ridden” women and children streaming across the
Mexican border as justification for building a border fence.291 Five years later, the INS’s San
Francisco’s office began a “Chinese confession program” that aimed “to criminalize the entire
community.”292 The persistence of discretionary enforcement programs targeting vulnerable
minorities (defined in both racial and national origins terms) beyond the achievement of
formal neutrality in immigration law suggests that the culture of immigration enforcement
agencies remained prone to discriminatory uses of policy discretion.
It would be an exaggeration to suggest that immigration enforcement is always or
inevitably tainted with improper motive.293 More modestly, even this brief historical account
omits the pervasive influence of discriminatory statutory norms and periodic bouts of
discriminatory enforcement against ethnic and national groups, such as Filipinos, Chinese, and
Japanese. 294 Rather than a redoubt of administrative rationality, therefore, the history of
immigration administration strongly suggests its permeability to broader patterns of popular
animus. This openness in part results from the fact that immigration policy has often

KATHERINE BENTON-COHEN, INVENTING THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM: THE DILLINGHAM COMMISSION
AND ITS LEGACY 4-5 (2018).
288

Id. at 7.
NGAI, supra note 15, at 117-26.
291 Id. at 156.
292 Id. at 200-23.
293 For contrasting examples involving the government’s recognition of foreign-born nonmarital children of
American mothers, see Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy As the Border: Administrative Law and the Citizen Family, 66
DUKE L.J. 1727, 1745 (2017); cf. id. at 1753 (noting moralistic “expressive” character of many administrative
rules); Michael J. Churgin, Immigration Internal Decisionmaking: A View from History, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1650
(2000) (describing how agency opposition to a literacy test for migrants led President Taft to veto that measure,
although the veto was later overcome).
294 Erika Lee, The “Yellow Peril” and Asian Exclusion in the Americas, 76 PAC. HIST. REV. 537 (2007).
289
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developed “in an ad hoc fashion,”295 and been driven by the uncoordinated exercise of line
officers’ “discretion delegated down through the immigration agencies and memorialized
within decades of top-down directives.”296 Osmotic absorption of prevailing racial norms is
thus a function of decentralization and the diffusion of discretion.
In light of this history, it cannot be said with any confidence that policies adopted by
executive branch entities in respect to immigration enforcement will be free of improper
motive. Nor can it be said that judicial review to enforce antidiscrimination norms in respect
to those agencies will be unjustified. The assumptions upon which a Burkean claim to
deference would lie are therefore absent. At a minimum, this complicates Primus’s argument
that the absence of constitutional rulings against the federal government on antidiscrimination
grounds reflected “shared federal norms,” often implemented in the form of “statutory and
administrative rules against discrimination.”297 The federal government is not a unitary actor.
In the mid-twentieth century, some elements of its regulatory state developed new modes of
antidiscrimination enforcement with positive spillovers for women and racial minorities.298 In
contrast, immigration agencies took a different path. Contra Primus, therefore, the absence of
constitutional antidiscrimination rulings cannot be explained as a matter of normative
convergence.
History also provides needful context for the ample precedent in which courts
exercised a light touch when supervising immigration decisions. 299 Placed in a historical
context characterized by overt racial, and even racist, criteria proliferating in the law, and a
judiciary at best abetting their application, 300 these precedents take on a less savory
complexion. Rather than reflecting durable Burkean wisdom, these decisions are better
understood as reflective of their time. To the extent they persist, they reflect the continuing
compromises of a judiciary unwilling or unable to buck popular discriminatory sentiment.
Hence, they are evidence of the constitutional common law method’s inability to work itself
wholly free of historical lapses of political morality. To the contrary, they show how a system
of constitutional stare decisis can conduce to the persistence of discriminatory postures
through its reliance on an earlier generation’s accommodating precedent.
3.

Functionalism and Comparative Institutional Competence

A history of discriminatory enforcement practices directly implicates the final,
consequential justification for elevating the dignified presidency, while subsuming evidence of
Cox and Rodríguez, President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 135, at 122 (underscoring the importance
of “innovation[s in] enforcement discretion that emerged to address particular contingencies and grew in scope
over time”).
296 Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1186
(2016).
297 Primus, supra note 29, at 1024-25.
298 See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the
Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 804 (2010) (documenting how “in the late twentieth century equal protection
followed a notably different path in administrative agencies than it did in the courts”).
299 See cases cited in supra note 139.
300 Besides Hirabayashi’s ode to the hermeneutics of Asian suspicion, see supra text accompanying notes 63 to 64,
consider the trilogy of cases in which the Court vindicated a straitened account of white identity as a
precondition of nationalization. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261
U.S. 204 (1923); Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925).
295
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improper motive. This argument from the executive’s comparative institutional advantage can
be discerned in the Court’s vague gestures toward “relations with foreign powers,” and
“classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances.”301 The
Court in such passages seemingly does not imply that discriminatory rules constitute justified
policy, such that they could survive strict scrutiny.302 Rather, it seems to lean upon a rule
utilitarian argument to the effect that judicial deference will, over the long term, produce better
outcomes. 303 This consequentialist position in favor of deference, at least in its most
sophisticated form,304 builds on an implicit comparison between the outcomes produced by
the executive acting alone and the outcomes produced by the executive operating under
judicial review. Because the former is an improvement upon the latter305—perhaps because
judicial view prevents justified actions or because it generates frictional transaction costs—it
concludes that intensive judicial review is unwise on the ground that it makes everyone worse
off. Consistent with this basic argument, the Roberts Court has embraced expertise in cases
involving not just immigration but also national security.306
This consequentialist argument is deeply flawed. It rests on an idealized, and quite
false, image of administrative expertise uninflected by prejudice or other errors. Even in the
national security domain, policy-making over the past half century has often been
characterized by deep and systematic error.307 More profoundly, the argument is based on the
unjustified assumption that experts embedded in specialized agencies will not be influenced
by the same discriminatory preferences and beliefs that influence the balance of the
population. That implicitly assumes that experts are as susceptible to bias as others, so there
is no reason to subject them to the same sort of judicial scrutiny any other policy receives. But
what justifies that assumption? It is simply a sort of idle class prejudice, odious in its own way,
to assume that expertise or education guarantees some kind of immunity from bias.308 To the
The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418–19 (2018) (citation omitted). For a more explicit version of this
argument in the national security context, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010).
302 Cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (requiring strict scrutiny when a suspect classification is
used in the carceral context to mitigate the risk of violence).
303 For a more precise formulation of this argument, see Eric Posner, Judges v. Trump: Be careful what you wish for,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2017, at A27 (“Courts have historically deferred to the president on national-security
matters because the president acts on the basis of classified information and may need to move quickly…. If
courts are now creating a “Trump exception” to settled law on presidential powers, we should also remember
that our safety depends on a return to the era in which the courts … trusted the president’s word.”); see also
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST 3, 9 (1973) (defining
rule utilitarianism).
304 It would be wrong and misleading to compare courts and the executive directly. The relevant question is
almost never whether courts would make better first-order policy choices than officials because the option of
courts as administrators is rarely on the table. It is rather whether the addition of judicial review to executive
action would improve outcomes.
305 It would be self-defeating to argue for deference against discrimination claims on the basis that the executive
is subject to democratic accountability. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 865 (2007) (offering a defense of deference based on democratic accountability). Where bias is directed
at a demographic minority, or a group without electoral power, democratic accountability is more likely to
intensify than to assuage bias.
306 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34; Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–19.
307 For a summary, see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 887, 905-18
(2012) (documenting seriatim policy failures in the counterterrorism domain).
308 In the 1950s, psychologists led by Henry Garrett, a chaired professor at Columbia University, rallied in
defense of racial segregation and a renewal of national security. Andrew S. Winston, Science in the service of the far
right: Henry E. Garrett, the IAAEE, and the Liberty Lobby, 54 J. SOC. ISSUES 179 (1998); see also John P. Jackson Jr.,
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contrary, as the Dillingham Commission’s work suggests, expertise is no prophylaxis against
animus. 309 And if there is no correlation between expertise and freedom from bias, the
justification for deference from discrimination law cannot be defended on the ground that
intensive scrutiny is simply not needed.
Moreover, when judicial review is narrowly focused on the vindication of
antidiscrimination norms, and limited to cases in which there is extrinsic evidence of improper
motives, the costs of such review are unlikely to outweigh its benefits. It is hard to see why
this, more finely calibrated, species of judicial oversight impinge on justified policy choices, or
impose unjustified transaction costs. Especially given a bureaucratic history of overtly
discriminatory policy choices, a limited form of judicial review—let us say, available only ex
ante and without any personal liability for officials—would militate against a reiteration of past
animus-driven policies. Its principal transaction cost would be a tax on overt reliance on
suspect classifications as proxies for security risk. Given the well-known perils of treating
minorities as per se perilous, it is hard to see how this rescission would impinge on public
good production. Indeed, it seems its most likely effect would be to militate against regressive
forms of policy-making that concentrate burdens on defined minorities without fully offsetting
gains in aggregate welfare, and to elicit more equitable distributions of state coercion. The
retraction of judicial scrutiny, therefore, is more likely to undermine than to solidify aggregate
social welfare.
In sum, formal and functionalist defenses of the dignified presidency as an adjunct to
the Article II discretion to discriminate are unpersuasive. Notwithstanding contrary precedent,
the case for a more robust judicial review, even if only in marginal cases where extrinsic
evidence of improper motive avails, is powerful.
B.

Implications

If the Article II discretion to discriminate is entrenched behind the façade of the
dignified presidency, it will alter the distribution of federal resources, the choice of federal
policy tools, and ambient levels of social stratification. Such discretion matters because
doctrine “in the public law domain can act as either a tax or a subsidy” by raising or lowering
the expected cost of a particular course of action.310 That cost may take the form of a damages
award or injunction, or, more weakly, may take the form of the expenditures and hassle
associated with a lawsuit. Rational government actors will respond to judicial decisions that
raise the expected relative cost of one pathway in relation to another (or one goal in relation to
a substantially similar alternative ambition) by reallocating resources. In consequence, a full
range of constitutional doctrine’s effects can be discerned only by a comparative analysis
across notionally distinct policy domains.311
The Article II discretion to discriminate arises against the context of large shifts in the
doctrinal plate tectonics. Its recognition coincides with an increasingly stringent judicial
The scientific attack on Brown v. Board of Education, 1954-1964, 59 Am. Psych. 530 (2004) (describing a concerted
effort by psychologists to have Brown overruled on scientific grounds).
309 BENTON-COHEN, supra note 288, at 4-7.
310 Huq & Lakier, supra note 255, at 1566.
311 Cf. id. at 1571-74 (pursuing this comparative inquiry in a different domain of federal law).
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superintendence of federal regulatory policy. 312 The resulting asymmetrical distribution of
deference—strong for coercive actions, weak for regulatory policy—will likely influence the
allocation of federal resources. All else being equal, the executive is now more likely to be able
to achieve policy outcomes (of whatever sort) by resorting to its coercive instruments rather
than its regulatory toolkit. In practical effect, the discretion recognized in the Travel Ban Case
is a subsidy and a spur to what Pierre Bourdieu called “the right hand of the state,” while the
minatory view of regulation works as a handicapping of “the social state,” which “safeguards
the interests of the dominated, the culturally and economically dispossessed, [and] women.”313
This asymmetrical tax on policy instruments will have predictable regressive effects. Less
certain are the justifications, if any, the Court has for favoring one modality of policy-making
by the federal state over another. There is no a priori reason to favor coercive instruments
over regulatory instruments to generate public good. To the contrary, all else being equal, it
seems likely that the former will have greater negative externalities—they are overtly coercive,
after all—than the latter. It is hence a potent paradox of the Court’s intervention in the name
of freeing the state’s hand to achieve public goods that it may well be pushing the federal
government to rely on policy instruments with more frictional costs. It is a paradox that in the
name of the nation the Court is pressing the federal government into approaches that hurt not
only subordinated minority, but that harm us all.
Consider also the attendant implications for an understanding of Article III’s role in
the constitutional scheme. The judicial recognition of an Article II discretion to discriminate
rests on the assumption that antidiscrimination norms must be subordinated to other public
policy goals in the absence of any demonstrated compelling state interest. In both the
Japanese-American internment cases and the Travel Ban Case, therefore, federal courts failed
to engage in the ordinary process of discovery-driven inquiry into the facts. In the former, the
Court simply declined to address the legality of the internment itself, obviating the need for
factual investigation.314 In the latter, the Court largely resolved the constitutional question
prior to, and without the benefit of, discovery on a motion for a preliminary injunction.315
Such resort to fact-light adjudication has wider consequences. Because the Court serves as a
focus of national policy debates, its choices about how to frame constitutional questions—
and in particular its choices about which facts are relevant to those questions—can influence
public understanding of consequential policies. Foreclosure of the public airing of relevant
facts risks a “hermeneutic injustice,” in which significant facts are “obscured from collective
understanding.”316 By blinding the public to the existence and magnitude of an injustice, the
Court perpetuates and deepens its wrong.
It is important to observe that such epistemic foreclosure is not always successful.
Indeed, the Japanese-American internment is an instance in which the Court did not
See cases cited in supra note 152. A summary of recent developments is Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional
Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 943-55 (2018).
313 PIERRE BOURDIEU, FIRING B ACK: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 35 (2003) (describing the right
hand of the state as “represented by the ministries of finance and budget as well as the repressive arm of the
state (police, courts, prison, military)”).
314 See supra text accompanying notes 66 to 69.
315 The Travel Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction). The
Court’s constitutional analysis ignored the limited factual record prior to discovery, and suppressed the
possibility that discovery might alter that record.
316 MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 154-55 (2007).
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“legitimiz[e] the federal government's World War II internment of people of Japanese
descent.”317 To the contrary, the Court’s 1948 decision in Oyama,318 a mere five years after the
Korematsu and long before the latter’s induction into the anticanon,319 repudiated the very same
form of animus given a pass in the internment decisions.
The pathway to an anti-canonization of the Travel Ban Case, for those who wish to
travel it, is likely to be arduous and piecemeal, especially given the composition of the current
Court. But it is hardly unimaginable. I have suggested that the deep moral wrong of not only
that case, but also the Japanese-American internment case, was its failure to acknowledge what
was plain for all others to see. This is not an error in logic or method. “Logic is silent on how
to classify particulars—and this is not the heart of a judicial decision.”320 It was an error that
tracks precisely the Plessy Court’s claim that “enforced separation of the two races” as practiced
in the Jim Crow South imposed no “badge of inferiority” unless “the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.”321 It is a failure of just perception, therefore, that finds its
strongest antecedent in case law still rightfully viewed as repugnant and odious.
The test of constitutional antidiscrimination jurisprudence over the next generation,
therefore, may turn on whether this parallel is properly recognized, or instead whether the
Article II discretion to discriminate metastasizes beyond its present inchoate bounds.
Conclusion
Judicial decisions, like elections, have consequences. The immediate consequence of
the Travel Ban Case is the formal recognition of an Article II discretion to discriminate that,
to date, has been at best implicit in the jurisprudence. The decision’s internal contradiction
will generate only fragile constitutional restraint on the federal executive’s choice of
discriminatory policies closely analogous to the internment of the 1940s or the exclusion of
2017 onward. Exact carbon copies of the Japanese-American exclusion might be beyond the
Constitution’s bounds. But because the government has a wide variety of close substitutes that
can mimic many (although perhaps not quite all) of the internment’s effects while evading any
formal parallelism, it has a broad capacity to circumvent any collision with the law. In a febrile
geopolitical environment characterized by a resurgence of exclusionary populism,322 it seems
fair to characterize this authority as a “loaded weapon” of sorts.323
The Article II discretion to discriminate recognized in the Travel Ban Case has
uncertain bounds because of the difficulty of reconciling the Court’s twin holdings. But over
time, those bounds will be settled. In part, this will happen through judicial application, and it
is worth recalling here that Oyama follows Korematsu. But in important part, it will also happen
through public discourse, through what Hannah Arendt called the “incessant talk” that
Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 633, 648 (2009).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); see also text accompanying notes 16 to 27 (discussing Oyama).
319 Greene, supra note 56, at 455-56 (discussing the timing of Korematsu’s negative treatment).
320 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610 (1958).
321 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
322 On the rise of populism and its relation to constitutional norms, see Aziz Z. Huq, The People Versus the
Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (2018).
323 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”).
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redeems “the affairs of man from their inherent futility” by generating “certain concepts,
certain guideposts for future remembrance.”324 It will happen, I hope, through a measure of
public remembrance and recognition of the basic moral wrong of failing to recognize a
harmful act borne of hate.
This Article is a small contribution to that Arendtian project. It recognizes in that
regard that the Court might have the last say as a matter of law, but has no authority to close
the historical record. Facts will out; they are pesky that way. Whether the Article II discretion
to discriminate remains part of our constitutional canon and our moral heritage, as a
consequence, very much remains to be seen. At the very least, the choice is a matter too
pressing and too pregnant with normative freight to be left to the fragile moral compass of
the Roberts Court alone.
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